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IMMIGRATION LAW 
BUTROS v. INS: THE FOLLY OF FINALITY 
AS AN ABSOLUTE BAR TO SEEKING 
§ 212(c) RELIEF FROM DEPORTATION 
I. INTRODUCTION 
In Butros v. INS,l the Ninth Circuit, sitting en bane, held 
that an alien who has established lawful permanent resident 
(hereinafter "LPR") status in the United States may seek dis-
cretionary relief'l from deportation so long as his case may be 
appealed to the Ninth Circuit, or reopened or reconsidered by 
the Board of Immigration Appeals ("BIA" or "Board," hereinaf-
ter used interchangeably).3 In effect, this ruling does not recog-
nize the finality of a deportation order until the alien physically 
1. 990 F.2d 1142 (9th Cir. 1993) (per Noonan, J.; Fernandez, Beezer, Hall, JJ., con-
curring; Trott, Brunetti, JJ., dissenting). 
2. Discretionary relief from an order of deportation may be granted at the discretion 
of the Attorney General. It may be sought pursuant to § 212(c) of the Immigration and 
Nationality Act [hereinafter, "INA"]. Section 212(c) is codified as 8 U.S.C. § 1182(c) 
(1988). It provides in pertinent part: 
Aliens lawfully admitted for permanent residence who tempo-
rarily proceeded abroad voluntarily and not under an order of 
deportation, and who are returning to a lawful unrelinquished 
domicile of seven consecutive years, may be admitted in the 
discretion of the Attorney General . . . . 
The statute was specifically designed to afford relief to aliens in exclusion, and not de-
portation, proceedings. Case law has extended its application to deportation proceedings. 
See, e.g., Tapia-Acuna v. INS, 640 F.2d 223 (9th Cir. 1981); Francis v. INS, 532 F.2d 268 
(2d Cir. 1976); Matter of Marin, 16 I. & N. Dec. 581 (1978); see infra notes 56-66 and 
accompanying text discussing the evolution of § 212(c) to encompass deportation 
proceedings. 
3. Butros, 990 F.2d at 1144-46. Motions to reopen or reconsider are governed by 
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leaves the United States! The Ninth Circuit's ruling allows 
aliens to seek relief not only from deportation orders issued by 
an immigration judge but, more importantly, from deportation 
orders which are "administratively final",5 The Ninth Circuit's 
ruling is, however, limited to those aliens who have already 
maintained LPR status for seven years,6 
Prior to Butros, the Ninth Circuit, in Gonzales v, INS,7 
barred such discretionary relief under the rationale that (1) the 
BIA's initial denial of relief rendered the deportation order ad-
ministratively final; (2) that an administratively final deporta-
tion order terminated the lawfulness of the alien's domicile in 
the United States by divesting the alien's LPR status; and (3) 
that § 212(c) requires an alien to maintain present LPR status,B 
Butros overruled Gonzales,9 The Ninth Circuit explained 
that the fallacy of Gonzales was the belief that what is final for 
certain administrative purposes is final for all purposes,lO The 
Butros court reasoned that so long as the BIA could reopen or 
reconsider an administratively final decision on its own motion, 
an alien's motion could not be summarily denied under the pre-
tense that the deportation order had been finalized,ll 
Although the result is fair on the Butros facts,12 the Ninth 
4. See 8 C.F.R. § 3.2. ("A motion to reopen or a motion to reconsider shall not be 
made by or in behalf of a person who is the subject of deportation proceedings subse-
quent to his departure from the United States. Any departure from the United States of 
a person who is the subject of deportation proceeding after the making of a motion to 
reopen or a motion to reconsider shall constitute a withdrawal of such motion."); see 
infra note 26 for the full text of this regulation. 
5. An immigration judge's deportation order becomes administratively final when 
affirmed by the BIA. See Matter of Lok, 18 I. & N. Dec. 101, 105 (1981). 
6. Butros, 990 F.2d at 1146 (declining to decide whether the Butros rule would be 
applied to aliens who had not maintained LPR status for seven years). 
Section 212(c) requires that an alien have established a seven-year lawful domicile 
to be eligible for discretionary relief. The Ninth Circuit recognizes a seven-year lawful 
domicile only if the alien possessed LPR status for the seven years. See, e.g., Castillo-
Felix v. INS, 601 F.2d 459 (9th Cir. 1979). 
7. 921 F.2d 236 (9th Cir. 1990). 
8. See id. at 238-41. 
9. Butros, 990 F.2d at 1145. 
10. ld. 
11. ld. 
12. Evidence suggests that Butros' inability to receive discretionary relief at the ini-
tial hearing resulted through his original lawyer's incompetence. See infra note 25 
presenting such evidence. . 
2
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Circuit's new rule is problematic. By delaying the point at which 
a deportation order is deemed final and limiting their holding to 
aliens with seven or more years of LPR status, the Ninth Circuit 
has created the potential for unintelligible distinctions and in-
congruous results. 13 The ruling has also added another branch to 
the multi-faceted circuit split created by inconsistent judicial in-
terpretation of § 212(c).14 
Through an analysis of the chain of reasoning that led the 
court to the Butros decision, this article will demonstrate how 
abolishing the requirement that aliens possess present LPR sta-
tus would have achieved the same fair result without fostering 
the circuit split or spurring on unintended, unwanted results. 
The suggested approach differs from the Ninth Circuit's rule in 
two significant ways. First it would change an alien's status from 
LPR to non-LPR upon an administratively final deportation or-
der. Second, and more importantly, it would not absolutely bar 
non-LPR aliens from simply seeking § 212(c) relief. III 
II. FACTS 
Nairn Butros entered the United States in February 1975 as 
Although the Ninth Circuit allowed Butros the opportunity to seek discretionary 
relief, Butros would then have the heavy burden of convincing the BIA that his motion 
to reopen and reconsider should be granted. See Matter of Coelho, Int. Dec. 3172 (BIA, 
Apr 30, 1992). If the motion were granted, Butros would then have to convince an immi-
gration judge that he actually deserved discretionary relief. Whether Butros ultimately 
receives relief is immaterial. What is important is that he was given the opportunity to 
make his arguments and that the ultimate decision will be based upon the merits of his 
case and not upon procedural technicaliti~s. 
13. See infra notes 244-49 and accompanying text discussing the potential problems 
created by the Butros rule. 
14. See infra notes 250-60 and accompanying text describing the present state of 
the law in various circuits. 
Through Butros, the Ninth Circuit has offered yet another interpretation of perhaps 
the most ambiguous statutory provision in the INA. See infra notes 73-108 and accom-
panying text for the varying interpretations regarding (1) the commencement of an 
alien's lawful domicile for purposes of § 212(c) relief, (2) the termination of such lawful 
domicile, and (3) motions to reopen or reconsider the denial of § 212(c) relief. 
15. Tying § 212(c) eligibility to an administratively final deportation order is a re-
quirement absent in the language and legislative history of § 212(c). The requirement 
was created in Gonzales through a misunderstanding of a prior BIA case (Matter of Lok 
11). See infra notes 198-216 and accompanying text discussing the misunderstanding. 
This misunderstanding was compensated for rather than corrected in Butros. See infra 
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an LPR.I8 He was six years old at the timeY In 1987, he was 
convicted of a drug offense in Oregon. I8 This conviction ren-
dered Butros deportable under § 241(a)(11) of the INA.I9 The 
Immigration and Naturalization Service ("INS") subsequently 
moved to deport him.20 At the time, Butros' family resided in 
the United States.21 Butros conceded deportability but moved 
for relief under § 212(c) of the INA.22 In 1988, the immigration 
judge denied relief and entered a deportation order.23 
Butros immediately filed an appeal to the BIA.24 The BIA 
summarily dismissed the appeal because Butros failed to specify 
the reasons for his appeal. 25 
16. See Butros v. INS, 990 F.2d 1142, 1142-43 (9th Cir. 1993). 
17. See [d. at 1142. 
18. See Butros, 990 F.2d at 1143. In 1986, Butros was involved in a motorcycle acci-
dept which resulted in a broken arm, a broken jaw and the loss of four teeth. Petitioner's 
Brief at 4, Butros (No. 91-70372) (hereinafter, "P.B."). At least two treating physicians 
independently prescribed Percodan for the pain. [d. Percodan is known to cause depen-
dency. After the prescriptions ceased, Butros began using cocaine, an illegal drug similar 
in nature and effect to Percodan. [d. Butros claimed to have sold cocaine solely to supply 
his lawfully acquired habit of taking Percodan. Respondent's Brief at 8, Butros (No. 91-
70372) (hereinafter "R.B."). 
19. Codified as 8 U.S.C. § 1251(a)(11) (1988) amended by 8 U.S.C. 
§ 1251(a)(2)(B)(i) (Supp. II 1990). 
20. See Butros, 990 F.2d at 1143. 
21. His mother, father, and sister also resided in the United States as LPRs. R.B. at 
5-6. His three brothers were naturalized citizens. [d. 
22. See supra note 2 for the text of § 212(c). This provision has been extended to 
cover aliens who have not left the country. Francis v. INS, 532 F.2d 268 (2d Cir. 1976); 
see infra notes 56-63 and accompanying text discussing the Francis court's rationale. 
23. See Butros, 990 F.2d at 1143. The Immigration Judge was prepared to make a 
favorable ruling until the INS presented its case in rebuttal. [d. at 1147. Butros' non-
disclosure of a subsequent arrest for selling cocaine was found to be representative of his 
lack of rehabilitation. [d. Furthermore, the Judge was distressed by the statement, "You 
didn't do anything before, why do you think you can do anything now?" which Butros 
had made to an official following the second arrest. [d. 
24. See Butros, 990 F.2d at 1147. The BIA reviews administrative rulings of immi-
gration judges. See 8 C.F.R. § 3.1(b) (1992). 
25. See Butros, 990 F.2d at 1147. The BIA acted in accordance with 8 C.F.R. 
§ 3.1(d)(1-a)(i) (allowing the BIA to summarily dismiss any appeal in any case when the 
alien fails to specify the reasons for appeal). Butros later accredited the omission to inef-
fective assistance of counsel. See Butros, 990 F.2d at 1143. 
Following the BIA's dismissal Butros hired a new lawyer. [d. at 1147. The new coun-
sel filed a complaint against prior counsel with the Oregon State Bar. See Butros v. INS, 
804 F. Supp. 1336, 1338 (D. Or. 1991). The complaint alleged that prior counsel "failed 
to clarify a crucial error, failed to call favorable witnesses, failed to prepare petitioner 
adequately and failed to understand the law." [d. 
Butros also applied to the district director for a stay of deportation which was de-
nied shortly thereafter. Butros, 990 F.2d at 1143. 
4
Golden Gate University Law Review, Vol. 24, Iss. 3 [1994], Art. 6
http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/ggulrev/vol24/iss3/6
1994] IMMIGRATION LAW 611 
Butros then filed a "Motion to Reopen and Reconsider"26 
with the BIA.27 He claimed ineffective assistance of counsel and 
offered new evidence.28 
The BIA refused to reopen or reconsider Butros' case be-
cause the deportation order "became administratively final at 
26. See 8 C.F.R. § 3.2. The regulation provides: 
The Board may on its own motion reopen or reconsider 
any case in which it has rendered a decision. Reopening or 
reconsideration of any case in which a decision has been made 
by the Board, whether requested by the Commissioner or any 
other duly authorized officer of the Service, or by the party 
affected by the decision, shall be only upon written motion to 
the Board. Motions to reopen in deportation proceedings shall 
not be granted unless it appears to the Board that evidence 
sought to be offered is material and was not available and 
could not have been discovered or presented at the former 
hearing; nor shall any motion to reopen for the purpose of af-
fording the alien an opportunity to apply for any form of dis-
cretionary relief be granted if it appears that the alien's right 
to apply for such relief was fully explained to him and an op-
portunity to apply therefor was afforded him at the former 
hearing unless the relief is sought on the basis of circum-
stances which have arisen subsequent to the hearing. A motion 
to reopen or a motion to reconsider shall not be made by or in 
behalf of a person who is the subject of deportation proceed-
ings subsequent to his departure from the United States. 
Any departure from the United States of a person who is the 
subject of deportation proceedings occurring after the mak-
ing of a motion to reopen or a motion to reconsider shall con-
stitute a withdrawal of such motion. For the purpose of this 
section, any final decision made by the Commissioner prior to 
the effective date of the Act with respect to any case within 
the classes of cases enumerated in § 3.l(b)(I), (2), (3), (4), or 
(5) shall be regarded as a decision of the Board. 
[d. (emphasis added). 
27. See Butros, 990 F.2d at 1143. 
28. [d. 
Butros also asked the BIA for a stay of deportation. [d. Without the stay of deporta-
tion, Butros would have been physically deported from the United States before the BIA 
ruled on the motion to reopen and reconsider. Consequently, any motion to reopen or 
reconsider on Butros' behalf would have been considered withdrawn. See 8 C.F.R. § 3.2; 
see supra note 26 for the text of the regulation. The BIA denied the stay. See Butros, 
990 F.2d at 1143. 
Butros then filed a petition of habeas corpus in the United States District Court for 
the District of Oregon. [d. The District Court reversed the BINs decision and granted 
the stay of deportation. [d. The District Court observed that Butros' claim was "not 
frivolous." [d. The denial of the stay effectively foreclosed "petitioner's right under 8 
C.F.R. §§ 3.2, 3.8 to move to reopen this case." [d. The District Court concluded that 
the denial of the stay was an abuse of discretion. [d. 
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the time of [the summary dismissal of the initial appeal]."29 The 
BIA reasoned that at the time of administrative finality, Butros 
was divested of his LPR status and, therefore, became statuto-
rily ineligible for § 212(c) relief. so The Ninth Circuit Court of 
Appeals, sitting en bane, granted review.S1 
III. BACKGROUND 
The primary issue in Butros v. INss2 was whether the BIA 
correctly denied Butros' "Motion to Reopen and Reconsider" 
based solely on its conclusion that he was statutorily ineligible 
for § 212(c) relief. Logically, the Ninth Circuit had to analyze 
whether Butros was statutorily eligible for § 212(c) relief in or-
der to determine whether the BIA was correct in denying Bu-
tros' motion to reopen and reconsider. 
Section 212(c), as written, applies only to aliens returning 
from a temporary departure who are in exclusion proceedings. ss 
Case law has extended its application to aliens, such as Butros, 
who have not temporarily,proceeded abroad and are the subjects 
of deportation proceedings.s• Unfortunately, confusion has ac-
companied this extension as the various circuits have disagreed 
on the application of § 212(c) to deportation proceedings.slI 
A. HISTORY OF § 212(c) 
1. The Exclusion-Deportation Distinction and the Need for 
Discretionary Relief 
Deportation applies to alienss8 who have made an entryS'7 
29. See Butros, 990 F.2d at 1143. 
30. Id. Implicitly, the BIA required an alien to maintain LPR status when applying 
for § 212(c) relief. 
31. Butros v. INS, 977 F.2d 1358 (9th Cir. 1992). 
32. 990 F.2d 1142 (9th Cir. 1993). 
33. See supra note 2 for the text of the statute. 
34. See infra notes 56-66 and accompanying text discussing the extension of 
§ 212(c) relief to deportation proceedings. 
35. See infra notes 73-108 and accompanying text discussing the various construc-
tions of § 212(c). 
36. The term "alien" describes any person not a citizen or national of the United 
States. 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(3). The term "national" describes a person owing permanent 
allegiance to a state. Id, § 1101(a)(21). 
6
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into the United States, whereas exclusion applies to aliens at-
tempting to enter the United States.3S In general, the rules of 
exclusion are much stricter than the rules of deportation.39 
There were nineteen grounds of deportation40 as compared to 
thirty-four grounds of exclusion41 prior to the Immigration Act 
of 1990.42 Therefore, aliens could commit excludable offenses yet 
37. The term "entry" is defined as "any coming of an alien into the United States, 
from a foreign port or place or from an outlying possession, whether voluntarily or other-
wise ... [pJrovided, that no person whose departure from the United States was occa-
sioned by deportation proceedings, extradition, or other legal process shall be held to be 
entitled to such exception." 8 U.S.C. § 1101 (a)(13). 
38. See Landon v. Plasencia, 459 U.S. 21, 25 (1982) ("The deportation hearing is the 
usual means of proceeding against an alien already physically in the United States, and 
the exclusion hearing is the usual means of proceeding against an alien outside the 
United States seeking admission."). 
39. Compare 8 U.S.C. 1182(a) (1988) (the exclusion grounds) with 8 U.S.C. 1251(a) 
(1988) (the deportation grounds). The underlying rationale is that a person in the United 
States should be given every chance to stay, while an outsider should face heightened 
scrutiny before being allowed in. 
40. These include, inter alia, aliens who were excludable at entry, entered without 
inspection, have become institutionalized at public expense, have been convicted of a 
crime involving moral turpitude, currently advocate anarchy or communism, have en-
gaged or had purpose to engage in espionage, sll-botage or activities subversive to the 
national interest, are drug addicts or have been convicted of a violation of any law relat-
ing to a controlled substance, or have been convicted of possessing illegal firearms, nota-
bly the sawed-off shotgun. 8 U.S.C. §§ 1251(a)(1), (2), (3), (4), (6), (7), (11) and (14) 
(1988). 
41. These include, inter alia, aliens who are mentally retarded, are insane, are sex-
ual deviants, mentally defective or have psychopathic personalities, are drug addicts or 
alcoholics, are afflicted with a dangerous contagious disease, have been convicted of a 
crime involving moral turpitude, have been convicted of two or more crimes involving 
actual sentences of at least five years in the aggregate, have been convicted of a crime 
relating to a controlled substance or are suspected of involvement with the trafficking of 
controlled substances, are likely to become public charges, have been previously de-
ported, intentionally, negligently, or fraudulently failed to comply with documentary en-
try requirements, are or have been anarchists or communists, have assisted in the illegal 
entry of another alien into the United States, or are graduates of a foreign non-accred-
ited medical school and who enter with the intention of practicing medicine. 8 U.S.C. 
§§ 1182(a)(1), (2), (4)-(6), (9), (10), (23), (15), (17), (19)-(21), (28), (31), and (32). 
42. The Immigration Act of 1990 ("IA 90") completely reorganized the grounds for 
deportation. See Janet H. Cheetham, Deportation Grounds Under the Immigration Act 
of 1990, IMMIGRATION BRIEFINGS, NO. 91-11 November 1991. The nineteen distinct 
grounds were grouped into five categories: (1) Excludable at Time of Entry or of Adjust-
ment of Status or Violates Status; (2) Criminal Offenses; (3) Failure to Register and 
Falsification of Documents; (4) Security and Related Grounds; and (5) Public Charge. 8 
U.S.C. §§ 1251(a)(1)-(5) (Supp. IV 1992). Each category except the fifth is comprised of 
several grounds. A few of the old deportation grounds were abolished, including those 
which applied when an alien became institutionalized, involved with prostitution, was 
convicted of a violation of title I of the Alien Registration Act, 1940. 8 U.S.C. 
§§ 1251(a)(3), (12), (15), and (16) (1988). Several new deportation grounds were estab-
lished, including those which apply when an alien is involved in terrorist activities, un-
7
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not be deportable.43 
In such a scenario, so long as the alien remained within the 
United States, no action could be brought against him. Once the 
alien departs the country and attempts to re-enter, however, the 
grounds for exclusion would govern h.is admissibility. Since the 
alien had committed an excludable offense, the alien's re-entry 
would be barred.44 
The harshness of this anomaly can be illustrated by a hypo-
thetical example of an LPR41! who contracted a communicable 
disease46 while in the United States and traveled abroad for 
lawful technology or information transfer, money laundering, or when the Secretary of 
State has reasonable grounds to believe that the alien's presence or activities in the 
United States would have potentially serious adverse foreign policy consequences. 8 
U.S.C. §§ 1251(a)(4)(B), (4)(A)(i), (2)(A)(iii), (4)(C) (Supp. IV 1992). 
IA 90 completely reorganized the grounds of exclusion, as well. See Daniel Levy, 
Exclusion Grounds Under the Immigration Act of 1990: Part I, IMMIGRATION BRIEFINGS, 
NO. 91-8 August 1991; Exclusion Grounds Under the Immigration Act of 1990: Part II, 
IMMIGRATION BRIEFINGS, NO. 91-9 September 1991. There are currently nine categories of 
exclusion grounds: (1) health-related grounds; (2) crime-related grounds; (3) national se-
curity grounds; (4) public charge; (5) labor protection grounds; (6) prior immigration 
violations; (7) documentation requirements; (8) grounds relating to military service in 
the United States; and (9) miscellaneous grounds. 8 U.S.C. §§ 1182(a)(1}-(9) (Supp. IV 
1992). Each category except the fourth is comprised of several grounds. IA 90 abolished 
the exclusion grounds based upon mental retardation; physical defects which might im-
pede the aliens ability to earn a living; paupers, professional beggars, or vagrants; im-
moral sexual activity; and illiterate aliens over the age of 16. 8 U.S.C. §§ 1182(a)(1), (7), 
(8), (13) and (25) (1988). IA 90 added, inter alia, the exclusion grounds for drug abusers; 
export control violators; terrorists or PLO members; admissions which would pose seri-
ous foreign policy risks; participants in genocide; and international child abductors. 8 
U.S.C. §§ 1182(a)(1)(A)(iii), (3)(A)(i), (3)(B), (3)(C), (3)(E)(ii) and (9)(C) (Supp. IV 
1992). 
43. Interestingly, the grounds for exclusion and deportation overlap with respect to 
criminal offenses, public charges, documentary grounds and security reasons. However, 
there are distinct grounds for exclusion with respect to, inter alia, health-related and 
labor protection areas. 8 U.S.C. §§ 1182(a)(1) and (5) (Supp. IV 1992). 
44. A judicially-created exception, known as the Fleuti Doctrine, does apply if the 
departure was "innocent, casual, and brief." Rosenberg v. Fleuti, 374 U.S. 449, 462 
(1963); see Landon, 459 U.S. at 28-29; Git Foo Wong v. INS, 358 F.2d 151, 153 (9th Cir. 
1966). In Fleuti, the alien, who was homosexual, went to Ensenada, Mexico for "about a 
couple of hours." Fleuti, 374 U.S. at 450. Homosexuality was not a deportable offense 
but was aq excludable offense. 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(4) (1988). The INS sought to later 
deport Fleuti as excludable at time of entry. Fleuti, 374 U.S. at 450-51. The court sym-
pathized with Fleuti and did not classify his admission back into the U.S. as an "entry" 
within the definition of 8 U.s.C. § 1101(a)(13). Fleuti, 374 U.S. at 461-63. 
45. An LPR falls within the definition of "alien." See 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(3). 
46. Carrying a communicable disease is an excludable offense. 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(6). 
However, it is not a deportable offense. 
8
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treatment. Though he would not be deported while he remained 
in the country, following his departure he would be denied re-
entry based on his status as an excludable alien. Congress ini-
tially attempted to alleviate this problem through the "seventh 
proviso" of the Immigration Act of 1917,47 and, subsequently, 
through § 212(c) of the INA.48 
2. The Seventh Proviso: Statutory Precursor to Section 212(c) 
Prior to 1952, the "seventh proviso" of the Immigration Act 
of 191749 afforded relief to aliens in a predicament such as that 
of the hypothetical excludable alien.5O It provided that "aliens 
returning after a temporary absence to an unrelinquished 
United States domicile of seven consecutive years may be admit-
ted in the discretion of the Secretary of Labor and under such 
conditions as he may prescribe."111 An alien who had maintained 
the required seven-year domicile could thereby be allowed to 
seek a waiver from exclusion. Thus, in the above example of the 
alien with the communicable disease, so long as he had been 
domiciled in the United States for seven consecutive years prior 
to his brief departure, he could qualify for discretionary 
admission. 
The seventh proviso was criticized, however, because it did 
not require the original entry to be lawfully made,1I2 nor did it 
47. Act of Feb. 5, 1917, ch. 29, § 3, 39 Stat. 875 (repealed 1952). 
48. It is interesting to note that because the rationale behind enacting § 212(c) was 
to offer relief from excludable offenses, the statute was not designed to afford relief to 
aliens, such as Butros, in deportation proceedings. 
49. Act of Feb. 5, 1917, ch. 29, § 3, 39 Stat. 875 (repealed 1952). 
50. See supra notes 45-46 and accompanying text presenting the hypothetical. 
51. Act of Feb. 5, 1917, ch. 29, § 3, 39 Stat. 875 (repealed 1952). 
52. See S. REP. No. 1515, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. 66 (1950). The report contained the 
following language, 
It appears that when the seventh proviso was made a part 
of the 1917 act the proviso was intended to give discretionary 
power to the proper government official to grant relief to 
aliens who were reentering the United States after a tempo-
rary absence, who came in the front door, were inspected, law-
fully admitted, established homes here and remained for 7 
years before they got into trouble. 
[d. at 382. The report also stated that "[t]he subcommittee recommends that the proviso 
would be limited to aliens who have the status of lawful permanent residents who are 
returning to a lawful domicile of seven consecutive years after a temporary absence 
abroad." [d. at 384. 
9
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preclude nonimmigrantsli3 from qualifying.1i4 Congress addressed 
this criticism by incorporating a requirement that the alien have 
been "lawfully admitted for permanent residence." In 1952, this 
modified version of the seventh proviso was enacted as § 212(c) 
of the INA.1i1i 
3. The Expansion of Section 212(c) to Afford Relief From 
Deportation 
At its inception, § 212(c) relief was invoked only when an 
excludable alien physically departed the country and later re-
turned. lis In 1976, the Second Circuit's landmark decision in 
Francis v. INSli7 vastly expanded the scope of § 212(c). In Fran-
cis, the alien did not depart the United States following his con-
viction of a marijuana offense.lis The INS charged him with be-
ing deportable under § 241(a)(1l).1i9 Francis satisfied all 
§ 212(c) requirements but for his absence to depart the 
country.so 
The Second Circuit, applying the minimum scrutiny test,S1 
53. The nonimmigrant classes are listed in the INA. They include, inter alia, am-
bassadors, their staff and family, business visitors and tourists, students, and foreign 
media along with their spouses and children. 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101(a)(15)(A), (B), (F) and (I). 
54. See S. REP. No. 1137, 82d Cong., 2d Sess. 13 (1952). 
55. See supra note 2 for the text of § 212(c). 
56. In 1956, it was extended to aliens who had already reentered, under the ration-
ale that aliens who, if requested, could have asserted 212(c) at the time of reentry, 
should not be precluded from doing so simply because the excludable offense escaped 
detection until after admission. See Matter of G.A., 7 I. & N. Dec. 274, 276 (1956) (rely-
ing in part upon Matter of L., 1 I & N. Dec. 1 (1940». In Matter of L., the Attorney 
General accorded seventh proviso relief nunc pro tunc to an alien in deportation pro-
ceedings because the alien had departed the United States in the past and would have 
qualified at the time of last entry had he been excluded for his offense. Matter of L., 1 I. 
& N. Dec. at 6. 
57. Francis v. INS, 532 F.2d 268 (2d Cir. 1976). 
58. Francis, 532 F.2d at 269. 
59. [d. This ground of deportation parallels the ground of exclusion for possession of 
narcotic drugs. 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(23). 
60. See Francis, 532 F.2d at 272. Had Francis departed the United States and 
sought re-entry, he would have been able to seek a waiver of the exclusion charge under 
§ 212(c). 
61. This is an equal protection test under which "distinctions between different 
classes of persons 'must be reasonable, not arbitrary, and must rest upon some ground of 
difference having a fair and substantial relation to the object of the legislation, so that all 
persons similarly circumstanced shall be treated alike.''' [d. at 272 (citing Stanton v. 
Stanton, 421 U.S. 7, 14 (1975); Royster Guano Co. ~. Virginia, 253 U.S. 412, 415 (1920». 
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failed to discern a distinction between the class of aliens who 
had departed the United States following their deportable of-
fense and the class of aliens who failed to depart.s2 The require-
ment that aliens be "returning after a temporary absence" was 
therefore eliminated as violative of the equal protection guaran-
tee of the Fifth Amendment.ss The BIA voluntarily adopted the 
Francis rule.s" The Ninth Circuit, although initially reluctant,SII 
eventually followed the Francis rule.ss 
B. ApPLICATION OF SECTION 212(c) IN DEPORTATION CASES 
As originally drafted, § 212(c) relief would not have been 
available to the alien in Butros v. INS.s7 Section 212(c) explic-
itly requiI:es the alien to: first, be lawfully admitted for perma-
nent residence;s8 second, have temporarily proceeded abroad 
voluntarily and not under an order of deportation;s9 and third, 
62. Francis, 532 F.2d at 272, 273 ("Reason and fairness would suggest that an alien 
whose ties with this country are so strong that he has never departed after his initial 
entry should receive at least as much consideration as an individual who may leave and 
return from time to time."). 
63. Id. at 272-73. Courts have limited § 212(c) to only those grounds of deportation 
under 8 U.S.C. § 1251(a) which paralleled enumerated grounds of exclusion under 8 
U.S.C. § 1182(a). See Cabasug v. INS, 847 F.2d 1321 (9th Cir. 1988). 
64. See Matter of Silva, 16 I. & N. Dec. 26, 29-30 (1976); Matter of Hom, 16 I. & N. 
Dec. 112, 113-14 (1977); Matter of Marin, 16 I. & N. Dec. 581, 582 (1978). 
65. Prior to Francis, the Ninth Circuit had addressed § 212(c) and concluded that 
the alien must depart and re-enter the United States to qualify for the discretionary 
relief. Arias-Uribe v. INS, 466 F.2d 1198, 1199-200 (9th Cir. 1972). Following Francis, the 
Ninth Circuit continued to require physical departure without addressing the conflict 
between the two doctrines. See Castillo-Felix v. INS, 601 F.2d 459 (9th Cir. 1979); 
Nicholas v. INS, 590 F.2d 802 (9th Cir. 1979); Bowe v. INS, 597 F.2d 1158 (9th Cir . 
. 1979); see generally, Bill Ong Hing, The Ninth Circuit: No Place for Drug Offenders, 10 
GOLDEN GATE L. REV. 1 (1980) (advocating the Francis approach in the Ninth Circuit). 
66. See Tapia-Acuna v. INS,640 F.2d 223, 224-25, (9th Cir. 1981) (observing the 
Second Circuit's implicit extension of § 212(c) to only those grounds of deportation 
which would render the alien excludable). In cases where an alien's actions constitute 
grounds for deportation, but not exclusion, the Ninth Circuit has denied § 212(c) relief. 
See Cabasug v. INS, 847 F.2d 1321 (9th Cir. 1988) (alien convicted of carrying a sawed-
off shotgun, hence deportable under § 241(a)(14), denied § 212(c) relief as the convic-
tion would not render the alien excludable). The rationale for this distinction stems from 
judicial interpretation of Congressional intent that "[§ 212(c)] relief applies only to 
[§ 212], the exclusion statute." Cabasug, 847 F.2d at 1326. 
67. 990 F.2d 1142 (9th Cir. 1993). 
68. "Lawfully admitted for permanent residence" is defined as "the status of having 
been lawfully accorded the privilege of residing permanently in the United States as an 
immigrant in accordance with the immigration laws, such status not having changed." 8 
U.S.C. § 1101(20) (1988). 
69. This requirement has been abrogated by case law. See supra notes 56-66 and 
11
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be returning to a lawful unrelinquished domicile of seven con-
secutive years.70 As the statute was extended to cover aliens in 
deportation proceedings, administrative and judicial construc-
tion of § 212(c) diverged on such issues as when the alien's law-
ful domicile commences and terminates.71 Courts also divided as 
to whether the termination of lawful domicile renders the alien 
ineligible to move to reopen or reconsider the denial of § 212(c) 
relief.72 
1. Terminating Lawful Domicile Under Section 212(c) 
At issue in Butros u. INS7s was the termination of lawful 
domicile.74 The BIA and the various circuits have adopted dif-
accompanying text discussing its abolition. 
70. See supra note 2 for the text of § 212(c). Technically, § 212(c) does not require 
a showing of rehabilitation or extreme hardship. However, since relief is discretionary, an 
immigration judge may evaluate both factors before rendering a decision. See Matter of 
Marin, 16 1. & N. Dec. 581 (1978). An immigration judge may also require a showing of 
good moral character. See Matter of N., 7 I. & N. Dec. 368 (1956). 
71. See infra notes 73-90 and accompanying text discussing the different views with 
respect to termination of lawful domicile. 
72. See infra notes 91-108 and accompanying text discussing the different views 
with respect to motions to reopen or reconsider the denial of § 212(c) relief. 
73. 990 F.2d 1142 (9th Cir. 1993). 
74. Id. at 1144-46. The Ninth Circuit had to decide whether the administratively 
final deportation order terminated Butros' LPR status and, concurrently, his lawful 
domicile, because the Ninth Circuit had required present LPR status as a prerequisite to 
§ 212(c) eligibility. Id.; see Gonzales v. INS, 921 F.2d 236, 238 (9th Cir. 1990). 
Although the commencement of lawful domicile was not at issue in Butros u. INS, 
variations in its interpretation reflect the confusion caused by judicial extension of 
§ 212(c) to deportation proceedings. Determining when lawful domicile commences 
hinges upon whether the clause "lawfully admitted for permanent residence" is read to 
modify the clause "lawful unrelinquished domicile of seven consecutive years" or is read 
independently from it. See supra note 2 for the text of § 212(c). 
The BIA and various circuits do not consistently interpret the statutory language in 
determining when lawful domicile commences. See, e.g. Matter of Lok, 15 1. & N. Dec. 
720 (1976) (mandating that an alien establish the seven-year lawful unrelinquished dom-
icile after having been lawfully admitted for permanent residence, thereby nullifying the 
accrual of time toward the 7-year requirement that an alien lawfully spent in the United 
States prior to obtaining LPR status); Lok v. INS, 548 F.2d 37, 41 (2d Cir. 1977) (over-
ruling the BIA's interpretation in Matter of Lok and opting instead to further "the obvi-
ous purpose of the statute [which was] to mitigate the hardship that deportation poses 
for those with family ties in this country" by counting the time an alien resides in the 
United States, prior to obtaining LPR status, toward the seven-year requirement so long 
as the alien has legally resided in the country); Castillo-Felix v. INS, 601 F.2d 459, 465 
(9th Cir. 1979) (disagreeing with the Second Circuit's conclusion tha.t the BIA's interpre-
tation of § 212(c) was inconsistent with congressional policy as well as its statutory in-
tent, and recognizing that because it was called upon to interpret "an ambiguous provi-
sion with little legislative history to clarify how Congress intended it to be applied," it 
12
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ferent approaches in determining when lawful domicile termi-
nates.71i The BIA, in Matter of Lok,76 (hereinafter "Matter of 
Lok JI")77 ruled that once an alien is found deportable with ad-
ministrative finality, that alien can no longer be considered 
"lawfully admitted for permanent residence."78 The BIA consid-
was appropriate to defer to the administrative agency in charge); Chiravacharadhikul v. 
INS, 645 F.2d 248, 250 (4th Cir. 1981) (following the 9th Circuit's approach in deferring 
to the BIA); Anwo v. INS, 607 F.2d 435 (D.C. Cir. 1979) (adopting a two-part test for 
determining when lawful domicile begins: 1- focusing on whether the alien intended to 
permanently remain in the United States; and 2- analyzing whether such an intent was 
legal under U.S. laws). 
75. Recall, Butros overruled Gonzales on the issue of when lawful domicile for pur-
poses of § 212(c) terminates. Butros, 990 F.2d at 1145. 
76. 18 1. & N. Dec. 101 (1981). 
77. Tim Lok's ordeal through the administrative and judicial court systems resulted 
in two notable BIA decisions and two notable Second Circuit decisions. Matter of Lok, 
15 1. & N. Dec. 720 (1976) [hereinafter "Matter of Lok I"]; Lok v. INS, 548 F.2d 37 (2d 
Cir. 1977) [hereinafter "Tim Lok I"]; Matter of Lok II, 18 I. & N. Dec. 101 (1981); Lok v. 
INS, 681 F.2d 107 (2d Cir. 1982) [hereinafter "Tim Lok n"]. 
78. Matter of Lok II, 18 1. & N. Dec. at 105. 
That deportation changes an alien's status to one not "lawfully admitted for perma-
nent residence" is not supported by statutory language nor any legislative history. The 
legislative history is silent as to which changes in status remove the alien from this clas-
sification. Any analysis of § 212(c)'s legislative history, for purposes of deportation pro-
ceedings, should be strictly scrutinized because this statute was designed to accord relief 
in exclusion proceedings. Administrative and case law have extended its application to 
deportation. See supra notes 56-66 and accompanying text discussing the extension. 
In Matter of S., 6 1. & N. Dec. 392 (1954), approved by Attorney General, 6 1.& N. 
Dec. at 397 (1955), the BIA examined the legislative purpose of § 212(c) and its precur-
sor, the seventh proviso. The BIA reasoned that the inclusion of the "lawfully admitted 
for permanent residence" requirement was geared toward a concern for nonimmigrants 
qualifying for discretionary relief. Id. at 396-97; see supra note 68 for the definition of 
"lawfully admitted for permanent residence." The BIA recognized that "language can 
have different meanings in the same act, and there is no rule of statutory construction 
which precludes the courts from giving to the word the meaning which the legislature 
intended it should have in each instance." Id. at 396. The BIA concluded: 
There is specific provision in section 247 whereby certain 
resident aliens may have their status adjusted to nonimmi-
grant status. And it is logical to assume that the Congress, 
having expressed a serious disapproval of the practice whereby 
7th Proviso relief was accorded to aliens who had been admit-
ted to the United States in a nonimmigrant status, wished to 
make it clear that not only was this type of relief not to be 
granted to aliens unless lawfully admitted as immigrants, but 
to emphasize that it was also not to be granted to aliens who 
thereafter changed their status from that of immigrants to 
nonimmigrants. It is our conclusion that in order to give effect 
to the overall legislative design, this is the meaning which 
must be given to the term "such status not having changed." 
Id. at 396-97 (quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(20» (emphasis added). The Ninth Circuit, as 
well as the United States Supreme Court, have affirmed this interpretation of the stat-
13
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ered four stages within the deportation process at which point 
the alien could be deemed to have lost the determinative status: 
(1) upon the immigration judge's initial determi-
nation of deportability, (2) when the immigration 
judge's order becomes administratively final, (3) 
when a United States Court of Appeals acts upon 
a petition for review of the Board's order or the 
time allowed for filing such petition expires, or (4) 
only upon the execution of the deportation order 
by the alien's departure, voluntary or enforced, 
from this country.79 
The BIA opted to terminate the alien's lawful domicile at 
the second stage-upon administrative finality of the deporta-
tion order, i.e., when the BIA affirms the immigration judge's 
decision.so 
The Fifth and Seventh Circuits have concurred with the 
BIA's approach.81 The Second Circuit generally agrees with the 
ute. Gooch v. Clark, 433 F.2d 74, 79 (1970) ("[The phrase 'such status not having 
changed'] refers primarily to aliens who have changed their status from immigrants to 
nonimmigrants."); Saxby v. Bustos, 419 U.S. 65, 72 (1974) ("[T]he change in status 
which Congress had in mind was a change from an immigrant lawfully admitted for per-
manent residence to the status of a nonimmigrant pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1257."). 
Nevertheless, necessity and common sense justify the BIA's interpretation. The op-
posite conclusion would be undesirable and contradictory-an alien, pronounced deport-
able with administrative finality, would qualify as an LPR. 
79. Matter of Lok II, 18 I. & N. Dec. at 105. 
80.Id. 
The BIA decided against the first stage, thereby preserving an alien's right to appeal 
an immigration judge's finding of deportability. Id. at 106. See 8 C.F.R. § 3.l(b)(2) 
(1992); 8 C.F.R. § 242.21 (1992). 
The fourth stage was disfavored as it could lead to "incongruous results." Matter of 
Lok II, 18 I. & N. Dec. at 106. The BIA, in hypothesizing such a result, postulated that 
"a clearly deportable alien who has exhausted all of his administrative and judicial ap-
peal rights but whose departure cannot for some reason be enforced (e.g., for a lack of a 
country that will accept him into its territory) may continue to accord designated rela-
tives visa preference so long as he remains in this country." Id. 
The third stage was also rejected. The BIA reasoned that, unlike a United States 
Court of Appeals which is limited to reviewing errors of law and unfairness in procedure, 
the BIA has plenary power to review an appeal de nouo. Id. at 106-07. Moreover, the BIA 
believed that extending lawful status to an alien under an administratively final deporta-
tion order, pending judicial review, would encourage spurious appeals to the courts. Id. 
at 107. In the BIA's opinion, such an inconvenience would far outweigh the "relatively 
rare instances where the court determines that the Board erred." Id. 
81. Rivera v. INS, 810 F.2d 540, 542 (5th Cir. 1987), reh'g denied en bane, 816 F.2d 
677 (5th Cir. 1987); Variamparambil v. INS, 831 F.2d 1362, 1366 (7th Cir. 1987). 
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BIA but has terminated lawful domicile at the first stage-upon 
a deportability finding by an immigration judge-in the event 
the alien fails to challenge the deportation order on the merits.82 
The Eleventh Circuit, in Marti-Xiques v. INS,83 employed a 
simple, yet extremely harsh, interpretation in determining when 
lawful domicile terminates. The Marti-Xiques court sought to 
avoid "the problem of tying the accrual of § 212(c)'s seven-year 
period to the quirks and delays of the administrative and judi-
cial processes."84 Its solution was to set the cutoff date at the 
time "the INS commences the deportation proceedings, i.e. 
when the order to show cause is issued."8 t! 
The Ninth Circuit divides aliens into two different catego-
ries in determining when their lawful domicile terminates. 
Aliens who challenged deportation orders on the merits would 
not lose their lawful domicile while their case was on appeal to 
the Ninth Circuit86 (the BIA's third stage), so long as the chal-
lenge was not frivolous. 87 
82. Tim Lok II, 681 F.2d 107, 110 (2d Cir. 1982). The court stressed that an immi-
gration judge's finding of deportability must be challenged on the merits in order to 
prevent lawful domicile from terminating. Id. An appeal to the BIA based solely on de-
nial of § 212(c) relief would not be considered "on t~e merits" and, therefore, lawful 
domicile would terminate. See id. 
83. Marti-Xiques v. INS, 741 F.2d 350 (11th Cir. 1984). 
84. Id. at 355. 
85. Id. Although this is not one of the four stages considered by the BIA, at least 
one commentator approves of it because: 
The hardship imposed by such a rule is outweighed by its ben-
efits; it is easily applied and treats all aliens facing deportation 
equally; it decreases the probability of meritless appeals; and 
it would promote the congressional goal of removing from the 
immigration laws procedural devices that permit aliens to ex-
tend their stay in the United States without justification. 
Matthew A. Reiber, Section 212(c) of the Immigration and Nationality Act in the Fed-
eral Courts, 24 COLUM. J. TRANsNAT'L L., 623, 646 (1986). 
86. Wall v. INS, 722 F.2d 1442 (9th Cir. 1984). The Wall court distinguished itself 
from Tim Lok II and Marti-Xiques because there the aliens had conceded deportability. 
Id. at 1444. The court reasoned that because "Wall had challenged the Board's de-
portability decision on petition to this court for review, his continued presence in the 
United States after the administrative adjudication of deportability was a matter of law, 
not grace." Id. Accordingly, Wall was allowed to accrue time on appeal toward the seven-
year requirement. 
87. Where the deportability challenge was on the merits but frivolous, the Ninth 
Circuit has deemed that the time on appeal to the circuit court would not be allowed. 
See Torres-Hernandez v. INS, 812 F.2d 1262 (9th Cir. 1987). 
15
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For aliens who conceded deportability but challenged the 
denial of § 212(c) relief, the Ninth Circuit, in Gonzales v. INS,88 
ruled that the alien's lawful domicile would be considered termi-
nated at the time of administrative finality (the BIA's second 
stage).89 Thus, the Ninth Circuit's view prior to Butros v. INS,90 
in relation to aliens who had conceded deportability but were 
challenging the denial of § 212(c) relief, was identical to that of 
the Second, Fifth, and Seventh Circuits in that they all termi-
nated lawful domicile at the time of an administratively final de-
portation order. 
2. Motions to Reopen or Reconsider the Denial of Section 
212(c) Relief 
If and when § 212(c) relief is denied, the alien may move to 
reopen or reconsider the decision.91 The BIA must deny the mo-
tion if the alien is prima facie ineligible; if there is an absence of 
previously unattainable, material evidence; or if § 212(c) relief 
would have to be denied in the exercise of discretion.92 Even if 
the motion could be entertained, the alien still bears the heavy 
burden of proving that the new evidence would likely change the 
outcome of the case.9S 
Butros v. INS 94 concerned the BIA's denial of Butros' "Mo-
tion to Reopen and Reconsider" on the ground that Butros was 
prima facie ineligible for § 212(c) relief.911 The Ninth Circuit re-
quires that an alien possess LPR status when moving to reopen 
in order to preserve prima facie eligibility.98 Aliens subject to a 
88. 921 F.2d 236 (9th Cir. 1990). 
89. [d. at 240. This rule is identical to the BIA's view in Matter of Lok II. See 
Matter of Lok II, 18 I. & N. Dec. at 105. 
90. 990 F.2d 1142 (9th Cir. 1993). 
91. 8 C.F.R. § 3.2; see supra note 26 for the text of the regulation. 
92. Matter of Coelho, Int. Dec. 3172 (BIA, Apr 30, 1992) (citing INS v. Doherty, 112 
S. Ct. 719, 725 (1992)). 
93. [d. 
94. 990 F.2d 1142 (9th Cir. 1993). 
95. See id. at 1144-46. 
96. Gonzales v. INS, 921 F.2d 236, 238 (9th Cir. 1990) ("Eligibility for a discretion-
ary waiver under Section 212(c) thus requires the petitioner (1) be presently a lawful 
permanent resident of the United States and (2) have a lawful unrelinquished domicile 
for seven consecutive years."). 
Butros overruled Gonzales to the extent that lawful domicile for § 212(c) purposes 
would not terminate upon an administratively final deportation order but when the BIA 
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final order of deportation lose their LPR status.97 Such aliens in 
the Ninth Circuit, then, become statutorily ineligible for 
§ 212(c) relief and cannot apply for, nor move to reopen or re-
consider the denial of, such relief.98 
The Ninth Circuit articulated the rationale behind this ap-
proach in Gonzales.99 The Gonzales court reasoned 
if section 212(c) were available to persons after an 
order of deportation is made final, then such ap-
plications would never end. An alien who was a 
lawful permanent resident for seven years and is 
then deported would, if Gonzales's [sic] argument 
is adopted, be eligible for 212(c) waiver indefi-
nitely, even after being deported. loo 
Thus, in the Ninth Circuit, an alien loses § 212(c) eligibility 
when the alien's LPR status, and concurrently the alien's lawful 
domicile, terminates. lol 
The Second Circuit, in Vargas v. INS,t°2 criticized the Gon-
zales decision for improperly denying a motion to reopen simply 
because the alien's lawful domicile had ended. loa The Vargas 
court stated, "we do not accept the view that a final order of 
deportation also bars an alien from requesting reopening of a 
properly filed Section 212(c) request. Such a motion requests no 
new relief, but simply asks the BIA to reevaluate a prior ac-
tion."lo4 Although not expressly stated, the Vargas court implied 
that LPR status terminates upon an administratively final de-
could no longer reopen or reconsider the case. Butros, 990 F.2d at 1145. In so doing, 
Butros passively affirmed the Gonzales requirement that present LPR status is required 
for § 212(c) eligibility. See id. 
97. See Gonzales, 921 F.2d at 238; Matter of Lok II, 18 I. & N. Dec. 101, 105 (1981). 
98. See Gonzales, 921 F.2d 236, 239 (9th Cir. 1990) ("The question is whether [the 
alien) was eligible under the statute at the time of her motion to reopen."). 
99. In Gonzales, the alien had satisfied the seven-year requirement long before de-
portation proceedings commenced. Gonzales, 921 F.2d at 239. Nevertheless, she was 
found statutorily ineligible for § 212(c) relief because she did not possess a lawful domi-
cile at the time she requested relief. [d. at 239-40. Her lawful domicile was deemed to 
have terminated when the immigration judge's order of deportation was affirmed by the 
BIA. [d. Thus, her motion to reopen was denied as she was prima facie ineligible. 
100. [d. at 240. But see infra notes 124-25 and accompanying text describing the 
Butros court's revelation of the flaw in the Gonzales court's reasoning. 
101. See Butros, 990 F.2d 1142; Gonzales, 921 F.2d 236. 
102. 938 F.2d 358 (2d Cir. 1991). 
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portation order but that the alien need not possess present LPR 
status to apply for § 212(c) relief or to move to reopen the de-
nial of such relief. The Second Circuit's concern obviously cen-
tered on the present LPR status requirement. 
The Ninth Circuit focused instead on the deportation or-
der's finality, the point at which LPR status terminates. Prior to 
Butros, the LPR status of an alien who had conceded de-
portability terminated upon an administratively final deporta-
tion order. 1011 Accordingly, an alien's motion to reopen or recon-
sider would have to be denied as the alien would have lost prima 
facie eligibility. lOS Following Butros, the LPR status of such an 
alien terminates when the alien has physically departed the 
United States. l07 Accordingly, an alien's motion to reopen or re-
consider would have to be considered so long as the alien did not 
leave the country. lOS 
IV. THE COURT'S ANALYSIS 
In Butros v. INS,t°9 the Ninth Circuit had to decide 
whether the BIA was correct in denying Butros' "Motion to Reo-
pen and Reconsider" for the sole reason that Butros was under 
an administratively final deportation order.llo The Ninth Circuit 
had previously affirmed the denial of similar motions under the 
belief that present LPR status is required to maintain eligibility 
for § 212(c) relief and that an administratively final deportation 
order terminates the alien's LPR status. lll The Butros court 
proceeded to review the rationale behind the existing rules. 
A. THE MAJORITy ll2 
Butros' claim hinged on whether the administratively final 
deportation order terminated his LPR status and, concurrently, 
105. Gonzales, 921 F.2d at 238. 
106. [d. 
107. See Butros, 990 F.2d at 1145; 8 C.F.R. § 3.2. 
108. See 8 C.F.R. § 3.2; see supra note 26 for the text of the regulation. 
109. 990 F.2d 1142 (9th Cir. 1993). 
1l0. [d. at 1144-46. 
111. See Gonzales v. INS, 921 F.2d 236 (9th Cir. 1990). 
112. Butros v. INS, 990 F.2d 1142 (9th Cir. 1993) (per Noonan, J.). 
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the lawfulness of his domicile.l1S In the court's opinion, this de-
termination depended on the interpretation of the statutory lan-
guage "such status not having changed. "ll4 The court viewed 
this as a purely legal question and proceeded to review the BIA's 
decision de novo. Ill! 
The court examined the BIA's regulations on motions to re-
consider or to reopen.l16 These regulations did not restrict the 
alien's right to move to reconsider or to reopen by any reference 
to administrative finality.ll7 The court observed that the BIA 
could reopen or reconsider the case on its own motion after the 
point of administrative finality, so long as the alien had not 
physically departed the country.llS The court believed the BIA's 
position to be contradictory in that administrative finality re-
stricted only the alien's right and not the BIA's right to reopen 
or reconsider the case. l1S 
The court then analyzed the legal precedent for the BIA's 
decision. Specifically, the court examined the reasoning in Mat-
ter of Lok IIl20 and Gonzales v. INS.121 The court recognized the 
policy concerns addressed in Matter of Lok II, including the 
danger of SpUrlOU~ appeals and "inherently incongruous" 
113. The majority implicitly affirmed Gonzales' requirement that an alien must pos-
sess LPR status at the time § 212(c) relief is sought. See Butros, 990 F.2d at 1144-46; 
Gonzales v. INS, 921 F.2d 236, 238 (9th Cir. 1990); see supra notes 96-101 and accompa-
nying text for a discussion of the Gonzales requirement. 
114. Id. at 1144 (citing 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(20) (1988)). 
115. Butros, 990 F.2d at 1144 (citing Abedini v. INS, 971 F.2d 188, 190-91 (9th Cir. 
1992) ("We review de novo the Board's determination of purely legal questions regarding 
the requirements of the Immigration and Nationality Act.")). 
116. Butros, 990 F.2d at 1144; see 8 C.F.R. § 3.2; see supra note 26 for the text of 
the regulation. 
Id. 
117. Butros, 990 F.2d at 1144. 
118. Id. (citing 8 C.F.R. § 3.2). 
119. Id. The court observed: 
If the Board's original decision were final as to the status of 
the petitioner for discretionary relief, then of course there 
would be no such thing as reconsideration or reopening for the 
petitioner who lost on the first round. But to say, as the 
Board's regulations do say, that you may have a second round 
and at the same time to say, as the Board says here, you may 
not have a second round, is to engage in contradiction. 
120. 18 I. & N. Dec. 101 (1981). 
121. 921 F.2d 236 (9th Cir. 1990). 
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results. 122 The court then observed that the Second Circuit had 
restricted Matter of Lok II to the class of aliens who had satis-
fied the seven-year requirement when they got into trouble with 
the law because the policy concerns were not as prevalent with 
respect to this class of aliens.123 
The court went on to address the concern raised in Gonza-
les that physically departed aliens would be eligible for § 212(c) 
relief absent a bar based on administrative finality.124 The court 
recognized that the BIA's own regulation effectively met this 
concern by prohibiting the reopening or reconsidering of any 
case "subsequent to [the alien's] departure from the United 
States."121i 
Butros overruled Gonzales. 126 The Butros court perceived 
Gonzales' fallacy to be "the belief that what is final for certain 
administrative purposes is final for all purposes. "127 The Butros 
court noted the BIA's recognition that "when appellate review 
exists, what looks like a final status can well turn out not to be a 
final status. "128 The court also gave considerable weight to the 
BIA's ability to reopen or reconsider cases on its own motion.129 
The court then stated that "[s]ince the Board's own practice, as 
well as its own regulation, establishes that for purposes of an-
other look by the Board the status is not final, there can be no 
pretense of anything so simple as one all-embracing notion of 
122. Butros, 990 F.2d 1145. The court cited as an example of an inherently incon-
gruous result, a deportable alien "having the right to accord a designated relative a visa 
preference so long as the alien remained in this country." Id. 
123. Vargas v. INS, 938 F.2d 358 (2d Cir. 1991). Recall, the Ninth Circuit, in Gonza-
les, extended Matter of Lok II's reasoning to situations where the seven-year require-
ment was a moot issue. Gonzales, 921 F.2d at 238. See supra notes 76-80 and accompa-
nying text discussing Matter of Lok II's reasoning. Thus, an administratively final 
deportation order was deemed to terminate any alien's LPR sta·tus and, more impor-
tantly, their eligibility for § 212(c) relief. See Gonzales, 921 F.2d at 238. The Gonzales 
court expressed concern that extending § 212(c) relief beyond an administratively final 
decision would result in all aliens, including those already deported, being able to qual-
ify. Id. at 240. 
124. Id. This concern led the Gonzales court to extend Matter of Lok II's reasoning 
to cases where the alien had already satisfied the seven-year requirement. 
125. Id. at 1146 (citing 8 C.F.R. § 3.2). 
126. Id. at 1145. See infra notes 221-60 and accompanying text discussing the 
ramifications of the Ninth Circuit's reversal. 
127. Butros, 990 F.2d at 1145 ("[W)hen appellate review exists, what looks like a 
final status can well turn out not to be a final status. "). 
128. Id. (citing Matter of Lok II, 18 I. & N. Dec. 101, 107). 
129. Id. (citing 8 C.F.R. § 3.2). 
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finality."130 Because no decision would ever be truly final, the 
Gonzales rule, which terminated eligibility for § 212(c) relief at 
the time of administrative finality, would be devoid of meaning. 
The Butros court then ruled that "so long as the Board may 
reconsider or reopen the case, the status of the petitioner in that 
case for purposes of § 212(c) relief has not been finally deter-
mined for purposes of action by the Board."131 
B. THE CONCURRENCEl32 
Judge Fernandez characterized the issue as being straight-
forward. 133 The regulations allowed for the reopening of any de-
cision, at any time, unless the alien had departed the country.134 
Because the regulations did not require the alien to maintain 
LPR status in order to reopen, Judge Fernandez saw no reason 
not to grant the motion to reopen. 1311 
He apparently believed that administrative finality did not 
130. [d. 
131. [d. The court also stated that "the Board erred in determining that the statu-
tory language on change of status applies to an alien whose case may be appealed, recon-
sidered, or reopened." Viewed under the BIA's four stages upon which lawful domicile 
could terminate, the Ninth Circuit's ruling seemingly extended the time of termination 
from the second stage (administrative finality) to the third stage (appeal) and to the 
fourth stage (physical departure). See supra note 79 and accompanying text listing the 
four stages first announced in Matter of Lok II, 18 I. & N. Dec. at 105. 
In reaching its conclusion, the court stressed that it did not determine whether Bu-
tros' motions to reopen or to reconsider should have been granted. Butros, 990 F.2d at 
1146. The court further limited its ruling by stating that: 
We are not deciding when an alien ceases to accumulate credit 
toward seven years of lawful permanent residence. By the 
same token we are not deciding the status of an alien subject 
to a deportation order for purposes of giving visa priority to a 
relative. 
[d. Rather, the case was remanded for the BIA to determine the merits of Butros' argu-
ments to reopen or reconsider. [d. 
132. Butros v. INS, 990 F.2d 1142, 1146 (Fernandez, J. concurring, joined by Beezer, 
J. and Hall, J.). 
133. See id. ("[T]he issue is a simple procedural one; it is a question of whether a 
determination of the BIA can be reopened and reconsidered at any time, regardless of 
the type of issue involved. As I see it the majority says, 'yes.' I do not see that as a 
radical or shocking answer, so I agree."). 
134. 8 C.F.R. § 3.2; see supra note 26 for text of the regulation. 
135. See id. Judge Fernandez apparently interpreted § 212(c) not to require that an 
alien be a lawful permanent resident at the time relief is sought. Since the regulations 
did not expressly bar the motion, Butros would be considered statutorily eligible. For 
this reason, Judge Fernandez favored granting Butros' request. 
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preclude an alien from reopening a case. Instead, he viewed fi-
nality as "a somewhat fluid concept in law, as it is in nature-at 
least until the entropy of the universe."ls6 Judge Fernandez rec-
ognized that Rule 60(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 
allows district court decisions to be reviewed and upset long af-
ter becoming final. ls7 He further observed that criminal deci-
sions can be overturned in habeas corpus proceedings long after 
being declared final. ls8 
In light of his analysis, Judge Fernandez saw no reason to 
consider cases and arguments regarding the "species of finality" 
for purposes of appealing to the Ninth Circuit. lsB Furthermore, 
Judge Fernandez declined to consider cases and arguments re-
garding the accrual of time toward the seven-year requirement 
during the appeals process.140 Judge Fernandez reasoned that: 
Those cases deal with precisely the same words in 
the statutory provision that we deal with here. Al-
though it might be exceedingly difficult to say 
that those words could have different meanings 
for our purpose . . . we need not discuss the is-
sue. All we need to do is hold the BIA to the regu-
lations the INS has adopted. If the INS now 
wishes to adopt different regulations, that route is 
available to it.141 
In his view, the regulations controlled the ruleY2 Thus, Judge 
Fernandez reasoned any change in the rule should be brought 
about through a change in the regulations, not a change in their 
interpretation.14s 
136. Butros v. INS, 990 F.2d 1142, 1146 (1993). 
137. Id. 
138. Id. 
139. [d. (distinguishing Chu v. INS, 875 F.2d 777 (9th Cir. 1989». In Chu, the BIA 
had affirmed the immigration judge's deportation order. Chu, 875 F.2d at 779. Chu then 
moved that the BIA reconsider. [d. Before the BIA ruled on his motion to reconsider, 
Chu petitioned the Ninth Circuit for review. Id. The Chu court dismissed the petition 
for review because the pending motion for BIA reconsideration rendered the deportation 
order non-final. [d. at 780-81. 
140. Butros, 990 F.2d at 1146 (citing Avila-Murrieta v. INS, 762 F.2d 733, 735 (9th 
Cir. 1985». 
141. Butros, 990 F.2d at 1146 ("[It] is not to say that a particular person will make a 
convincing argument for reopening; it is just to say that the person is not precluded at 
the outset. "). 
142. See id. 
143. [d. 
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C. THE DISSENT144 
Judge Trott prefaced his analysis by castigating Butros and 
the system which has allowed him to stay in the United 
States. 141i Judge Trott wrote: 
Butros was ordered deported on May 26, 
1988-almost five years ago. I write this dissent 
on March 15, 1993. Butros is still here. He has 
abused the privilege of living in this country by 
using and selling cocaine, the latter while on pro-
bation no less. When caught, he lied and arro-
gantly attempted to manipulate the system. Now, 
he claims he is entitled to another chance to con-
vince the INS he merits discretionary relief. Bu-
tros' statement to Fisher that the government is 
powerless to do anything to him was prescient. l4S 
Judge Trott began his analysis by exposing the paradox cre-
ated by applying different rules based solely on whether or not 
the alien has satisfied the seven-year requirement. 147 He then 
criticized the majority's choice of a de novo review. H8 Judge 
Trott next analyzed and approved the BIA's reasoning in estab-
lishing its rules which the majority struck down.H9 Judge Trott _ 
proceeded to review the current state of the law in different 
circuits. 1liO 
1. Paradox Created by the Diverging Rules m the Ninth 
Circuit 
Judge Trott criticized the majority's opinion as being con-
tradictory. Judge Trott explained that the majority's analysis 
144. Butros v. INS, 990 F.2d 1142, 1146 (9th Cir. 1993) (Trott, J., dissenting, joined 
by Brunetti, J.). 
145. [d. at 1146-47. 
146. [d. at 1147. Fisher was a Special Agent of the Portland Immigration Office. 
R.B. at 6. 
147. Butros, 990 F.2d at 1147. 
148. [d. at 1148. 
149. [d. at 1150. Judge Trott opined that the BIA's rule to terminate LPR status 
upon the entry of a final administrative order of deportation was "a cogent solution to'a 
problem which has no obvious or clear answer. As such, [Judge Trott] would accord the 
BIA's solution the considerable weight it is due under Chevron." [d. 
150. [d. at 1151. 
23
Figueiredo: Immigration Law
Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 1994
630 GOLDEN GATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 24:607 
categorizes an alien as an LPR for the purpose of moving to reo-
pen deportation proceedings but not as an LPR for the related 
purpose of accumulating time toward the seven-year 
requirement. lin 
2. Standard of Review 
Judge Trott flatly disagreed with the majority's choice of a 
de novo standard of review.1II2 Observing that the decision 
turned "not on statutory construction, but on the workings of 
regulations," he concluded that "the cited standard of review is 
irrelevant to the analysis."11l3 Rather, when reviewing a federal 
administrative agency's decision, he favored according deference 
to the "agency's interpretation of its governing statute with re-
spect to the filling of 'any gap left, implicitly or explicitly, by 
Congress.' "1114 
Judge Trott approved of the explanation of this rule of def-
erence as presented in Chevron U.S.A. v. Natural Resources De-
fense Council. lllll According to Chevron, a reviewing court deter-
mines whether Congress has directly spoken to the precise 
question at issue. 11l6 If their intent is clear, the court as well as 
the agency must abide by the "unambiguously expressed intent 
of Congress."11l7 In the event Congress has not directly addressed 
the precise question, the court should only consider whether 
"the administrative agency's standard is based on a permissible 
construction of the statute."11l8 Judge Trott observed that the 
151. Butros v. INS, 990 F.2d 1142, 1147 (Trott, J., dissenting). The distinction ex-
posed by Judge Trott does not follow from the definitions of either the word "lawful" or 
"resident" or any combination thereof. See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY, 885, 1309 (6th ed. 
1990). 
152. Butros v. INS, 990 F.2d 1142, 1148 (9th Cir. 1993) (Trott, J., dissenting). Under 
a 'de novo standard of review, the Ninth Circuit could impose its own interpretation of 
§ 212(c) on the BIA. Under the deferential standard of review favored by Judge Trott, 
the Ninth Circuit's role would be limited to asking only whether the BIA's interpretation 
was permissible. Judge Trott wrote, "the [majority's) opinion claims de novo power to 
interpret the statutes under consideration and to tell the INS how to construe and apply 
its regulations regarding motions to reopen. I respectfully believe the law is to the con-
trary." [d. 
153. [d. 
154. [d. (citing Morton v. Ruiz, 415 U.S. 199, 231 (1974». 
155. Butros, 990 F.2d at 1148 (citing Chevron, 467 U.S. 837, 842-43 (1984». 
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Ninth Circuit had followed the Chevron approach in Ayala-
Chavez v. fNSlr>e with respect to § 212(c) interpretation.160 Such 
an approach, he opined, would preserve national uniformity in 
the treatment of an agency's application of federal law.161 
In Judge Trott's opinion, Butros' appeal dealt with a gap in 
the law.162 The statutes were silent on when eligibility for 
§ 212(c) relief, as well as accrual of time toward the seven-year 
requirement, terminates.16s The statutes were also silent on re-
opening and reconsidering deportation proceedings.164 According 
to Judge Trott, it was the agency's regulations, and not the stat-
ute, which governed Butros' motion to reopen and to recon-
sider.16r> For these reasons, Judge Trott would have accorded 
deference to the BIA's interpretation of the statute and would 
not have applied a de novo standard of review.166 
3. Soundness of the BfA's Rule 
Judge Trott identified the issue in this case as being 
"whether an alien who has conceded deportability and been de-
nied discretionary relief under § 212(c) of the Act may be pre-
cluded by the [BIA] from making a motion to reopen for addi-
tional § 212(c) discretionary consideration on the ground the 
alien is no longer eligible for such consideration."167 Judge Trott 
recognized that the BIA deemed an alien statutorily ineligible 
159. 944 F.2d 638 (9th Cir. 1990). The Ayala-Chavez court gave considerable defer-
ence to the BIA's statutory interpretation. [d. at 641. It further noted: 
[Cjourts have always interpreted broadly the discretionary au-
thority of the Attorney General to grant or deny waiver of 
deportation. Inherent in this discretion is the authority of the 
Attorney General and his subordinates to establish general 
standards that govern the exercise of such discretion, as long 
as these standards are rationally related to the statutory 
scheme. 
[d. 




164. [d. (citing INS v. Doherty, 112 S. Ct. 719 (1992) (holding the authority for 
reopening deportation proceedings is derived solely from regulations promulgated by the 
Attorney General». 
165. Butros, 990 F.2d at 1)048. 
166. See id. 
167. Butros V. INS, 990 F.2d 1142, 1149 (9th Cir. 1993) (Trott, J., dissenting). 
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for § 212(c) relief when a deportation order becomes adminis-
tratively final. 168 At such time, a motion to reopen would not be 
entertained.169 He noted that the Ninth Circuit, prior to Butros, 
had followed this approach. l7O 
Judge Trott proceeded to analyze the BIA's position with 
respect to terminating lawful dOIl)icile, and § 212(c) eligibility, 
at the time of an administratively final deportation order.l7l He 
concluded that" [i]t makes no logical sense to grant a motion to 
reopen deportation proceedings for the purpose of considering 
an alien's application for § 212(c) relief when an alien has lost 
prima facie eligibility for such relief because he or she is no 
longer is (sic) a permanent resident."m As the BIA's determina-
tion as to Butros was' "a cogent solution to a problem which has 
no obvious or clear answer," Judge Trott would accord it defer-
ence arid preserve Gonzales. 173 
4. Circuit Split 
Judge Trott reviewed the discordant views of other circuits 
with respect to terminating eligibility for § 212(c) relief"'· He 
observed that the Fifth and Seventh Circuits affirmed the BIA's 
conclusion to terminate eligibility when a deportation order be-
comes administratively final. l7II He stressed that such a rule is 
sensible as "it gives the alien ample time to assert his claim for 
§ 212(c) relief and prevents him from litigating his various 
claims in piecemeal fashion."176 
Judge Trott then recognized how infidelity to the BIA's po-
sition has led to a multi-faceted circuit split.177 He speculated 
that such a split assures only uncertainty in the INS's quest to 
168. [d. at 1150. 
169. [d. 




174. Butros v. INS, 990 F.2d 1142, 1151-53 (9th Cir. 1993). 
175. [d. at 1151 (citing Variamparambil v. INS, 831 F.2d 1362 (7th Cir. 1987); Ri-
vera v. INS, 810 F.2d 540 (5th Cir. 1987)). 
176. [d. at 1151 (citing Rivera, 810 F.2d at 542). 
177. See id. at 1152. 
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equitably enforce the law across the nation. 178 In particular, 
Judge Trott noted the Eleventh Circuit's choice to terminate eli-
gibility when the order to show cause is issued, as well as the 
Second Circuit's exception for deportation orders which are not 
challenged on the merits.179 He postulated that the majority's 
holding would raise "more questions than it answers. "180 He 
questioned whether 
a motion to reconsider the denial of a motion to 
reopen [would] prevent the quickening of final-
ity? . . . Will these proceedings ever come to a 
conclusion? The majority opinion would do well 
to give this new rule more thought and more sub-
stance. It would appear, as it does to the INS, 
that this new rule "would recognize no finality 
(other than the 'physical deportation' of the alien 
from the United States) to an alien's right to seek 
reopening of deportation proceedings to further 
pursue an application for such relief even beyond 
the point that a loss of lawful permanent resident 
status clearly has occurred."181 
Judge Trott expressed concern over adopting a new inter-
pretation to a statute which is already disparately applied by the 
various circuits.182 He would have affirmed Gonzales, thereby 
maintaining allegiance, and observing deference, to the BIA's in-
terpretation of § 212(c).183 
v. CRITIQUE 
The Ninth Circuit, in Butros v. INS,184 ruled that a depor-
tation order, affirmed by the BIA, is not final so long as the case 
is appealable or the BIA is able to reopen or reconsider the case 
on its own motion. 1811 Consequently, an alien under a non-final 
deportation order retains LPR status, and lawful domicile, for 
178. [d. 
179. [d. at 1151 (citing Marti-Xiques v. INS, 741 F.2d 350, 355 (11th Cir. 1984) and 
Vargas v. INS, 938 F.2d 358 (2d Cir. 1991)). 
180. Butros, 990 F.2d at 1151. 
181. [d. (citing Matter of Cerna, Int. Dec. 3161 app. at 11 n. 1 (BIA Oct 7, 1991)). 
182. See Butros, 990 F.2d at 1152. 
183. [d. at 1153. 
184. Butros v. INS, 990 F.2d 1142 (9th Cir. 1993). 
185. [d. at 1145. 
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purposes of seeking § 212(c) relief. 186 Because the BIA is pre-
cluded from reopening or reconsidering only when an alien has 
physically departed the country, the rule, in effect, does not rec-
ognize a deportation order to be final while an alien remains in 
the United States.187 
Nairn Butros obviously benefitted from the ruling because it 
allowed him to stave off imminent deportation and argue his 
motion to reopen and reconsider his case, fqr purposes of seek-
ing § 212(c) relief.188 As to Butros, such a result is fair, given the 
peculiar set of facts in his case.189 However, the Ninth Circuit's 
rule is problematic because its inherent uncertainty may pro-
duce unintelligible distinctions or incongruous results. ISO It also 
adds a new interpretation to the growing circuit split enveloping 
§ 212(c).lsl 
The existing confusion could have been prevented had the 
Ninth Circuit abolished the requirement that aliens maintain 
present LPR status to preserve § 212(c) eligibility.ls2 The pre-
sent-LPR-status requirement was created in Gonzales u. INS/s3 
186. The Ninth Circuit expressly declined to decide whether the same alien would 
retain LPR status for purposes of accumulating time toward the seven-year requirement. 
[d. at 1146. 
187. See 8 C.F.R. § 3.2; see also supra note 26 for the text of the regulation. 
188. Butros, 990 F.2d at 1146. 
189. Recall that Butros has lived in the United States since the age of six. [d. at 
1142. His family resides lawfully in the United States. See supra note 21. His involve-
ment with drugs stemmed from legally prescribed doses of Percodan, a dependency-caus-
ing drug, following a severe motorcycle accident. See supra note 18. 
190. See infra notes 244-49 discussing potential problems created by the Butros 
rule. 
The Ninth Circuit's ruling also stands to benefit deportable aliens who cannot be 
physically deported. See, e.g., 8 U.S.C. § 1253(g) (1988) (imposing sanctions on countries 
which deny or delay acceptance of deportees); 8 U.S.C. § 1253(h) (Supp. IV 1992) (re-
stricting physical deportation when the alien's life or freedom would be threatened in the 
destined country). Under the Butros rule, a deportable alien who cannot be physically 
deported could not be considered to have lost LPR status. See 8 C.F.R. § 3.2; see supra 
note 26 for the text of the regulation. Under the Butros rule such aliens, unlike their 
counterparts who had been physically deported, could likely maintain indefinite eligibil-
ity for § 212(c) relief. Such a result is unfair because the distinguishing characteris-
tic-conditions in the country the alien would be deported to-is, first, beyond the 
alien's control and, second, logically unrelated to statutory eligibility for § 212(c) relief. 
191. See infra notes 250-60 and accompanying text discussing the growing circuit 
split. 
192. See infra notes 261-80 and accompanying text discussing such an approach. 
193. 921 F.2d 236 (9th Cir. 1990). 
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through a misunderstanding of Matter of Lok II.194 Although 
Butros overruled Gonzales, it passively affirmed Gonzales' pre-
sent-LPR-status requirement. 1911 Had the Ninth Circuit correctly 
interpreted Matter of Lok II, they could have afforded Butros 
the relief he fairly deserved and avoided the present enigmatic 
fallout. 
A. THE NINTH CIRCUIT'S MISINTERPRETATION OF MATTER OF LOK 
II 
The Ninth Circuit, in Butros v. INS/96 as well as in Gonza-
les v. INS,197 arguably misinterpreted the BIA's position in Mat-
ter of Lok II.198 In Matter of Lok II, Tim Lok had not attained 
the requisite seven years of lawful domicile when his deportation 
order became administratively final. I99 By the time the case had 
passed through the immigration judge, the BIA (first-time),200 
the Second Circuit,201 back to the BIA on remand,202 back to the 
immigration judge on remand, and was certified to the BIA (sec-
ond-time),203 Lok had attained a seven-year domicile. 
The BIA, obviously disturbed by the prospect of aliens ac-
cumulating seven years of domicile while their cases were on ap-
peal, held Lok's lawful domicile expired when the original de-
portation order became administratively final. 204 An important 
factor in the BIA's reasoning was avoiding the incentive an op-
posite conclusion would create for aliens to file "spurious ap-
peals," thereby accumulating time toward the seven-year re-
quirement. 2011 Accordingly, the BIA ruled that an 
administratively final deportation order terminates LPR sta-
194. See infra notes 197-220 and accompanying text discussing the Gonzales court's 
misinterpretation of Matter of Lok II. 
195. See infra notes 226-34 arid accompanying text discussing Butros' passive af-
firmance of the Gonzales requirement. 
196. 990 F.2d 1142 (9th Cir. 1993). 
197. 921 F.2d 236 (9th Cir. 1990). 
198. 18 I. & N. Dec. 101 (1981). 
199. [d. at 104. 
200. Matter of Lok I, 15 I. & N. Dec. 720 (1976). Lok's lawful domicile commenced 
in 1971. [d. at 721. 
201. Tim Lok I, 548 F.2d 37 (2d Cir. 1977). 
202. Matter of Lok, 16 I. & N. Dec. 441 (1978). 
203. Matter of Lok II, '18 I. & N. Dec. 101 (1981). 
204. [d. at 110. 
205. [d. at 107. 
29
Figueiredo: Immigration Law
Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 1994
636 GOLDEN GATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 24:607 
tuS.206 At the time of administrative finality, Lok had accrued a 
lawful domicile of less than five years.207 Thus, Lok was held 
statutorily ineligible for § 212(c) relief.208 
The Matter of Lok II holding is susceptible to two interpre-
tations. Either Lok did not satisfy the seven-year domicile re-
quirement, or present LPR status is required to apply for 
§ 212(c) relief. 20D A close reading of Matter of Lok II suggests 
that Lok's motion was denied solely because he did not satisfy 
the seven-year lawful domicile requirement.2lO 
The BIA's opinion contained two headings, "Termination of 
Lawful Permanent Resident Status,"211 followed later by "Law-
fulness of Domicile Prior to Admission as Lawful Permanent 
Resident. "212 The analysis regarding the termination of LPR 
status upon the administrative finality of a deportation order 
was fully contained under the first heading.213 Had the BIA re-
quired present LPR status to apply for § 212(c) relief, they 
could have found Lok statutorily ineligible without having to 
discuss the commencement of his lawful domicile under the sec-
ond heading. The BIA must have proceeded to discuss the com-
mencement of Lok's lawful domicile, then, because it did not re-
quire present LPR status as a prerequisite for § 212(c) 
eligibility. Viewed this way, the BIA's intent in Matter of Lok 
II, seems clear-determine whether Lok had a seven-year domi-
cile by establishing when his lawful domicile began and 
ceased.214 It seems apparent that the BIA never intended to re-
206. [d. at 105. 
207. [d. 
208. [d. 
209. Under either interpretation, Tim Lok would have been statutorily ineligible for 
§ 212(c) because he possessed less than seven years of lawful domicile and because his 
LPR status terminated before he sought relief. 
210. See Matter of Lok II, 18 I. & N. Dec. at 105-10. 
211. [d. at 105. 
212. [d. at 108. Under this heading, the BIA discussed whether the time Lok spent 
in the United States prior to obtaining LPR status would count toward his seven-year 
lawful domicile. 
213. See id. at 105-07. 
214. The BIA concluded: 
On the basis of the foregoing discussion, we conclude that 
the respondent's lawful domicile began with his admission for 
lawful permanent residence on December 26, 1971, and ended 
with the termination of his lawful permanent resident status 
on July 30, 1976, when the order of deportation outstanding 
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quire an alien maintain present LPR status when applying for 
§ 212(c) relief. 
The Ninth Circuit, in Gonzales, misinterpreted Matter of 
Lok II to require present LPR status.2lII Accordingly, the Ninth 
Circuit believed that an administratively final deportation order, 
which divests an alien's LPR status, serve"s as an absolute bar to 
seeking § 212(c) relief.216 As a result, the Ninth Circuit effec-
tively requires deportable alien to possess present LPR status 
when applying for § 212(c) relief from deportation.217 This re-
sult appears to contradict the purpose behind offering relief 
from deportation. If deportability acts as a bar to seeking 
§ 212(c) relief from deportation, then an alien would only be al-
lowed to seek relief from deportation while not deport-
able-while still recognized as a lawful permanent resident of 
the United States. 
A misinterpretation of Matter of Lok II resulted in the par-
adox embodied in Gonzales. The Butros court, perhaps seeking 
to avoid imposing an absolute bar to seeking relief, overruled 
Gonzales to the extent that Gonzales terminated LPR status at 
the time of an administratively final deportation order.218 How-
ever, since the Butros court incorrectly interpreted Matter of 
Lok II, as did the Gonzales court, the resulting modification has, 
arguably, caused more confusion than resolution. For example, 
the Butros court left open whether the rule would be applied to 
aliens who have not met the seven-year requirement.219 The Bu-
Id. at 110. 
against him became administratively final. We thus hold that 
the respondent is statutorily ineligible for the relief he seeks 
under section 212(c) of the [INA). 
215. See Gonzales, 921 F.2d at 238. 
216. Id. 
217. Id. at 239. 
218. Butros, 990 F.2d at 1145. 
219. Id. at 1146. If the Butros rule is applied to aliens with a sub-seven-year lawful 
domicile, then these aliens could become eligible for § 212(c) relief while their cases pro-
ceeded through the courts. This result is undesirable as it could lead to the filing of 
spurious appeals to keep the case in court. See, e.g., Matter of Lok II, 18 1. & N. Dec. at 
107 (1981). 
If the Butros rule is not applied to aliens with a sub-seven-year lawful domicile, then 
the Ninth Circuit's distinction would be arbitrary. For example, a deportation order is-
sued by the BIA would be sufficiently final to terminate the LPR status of an alien with 
a sub-seven-year lawful domicile, whereas an equivalent deportation order would not be 
sufficiently final to terminate the LPR status of an alien with a seven-year-plus lawful 
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tros court also declined to decide whether aliens under adminis-
tratively final deportation orders could continue to accord rela-
tives visa preferences.22o 
B. OVERRULING GONZALES 
Butros v. INS221 and Gonzales v INS222 presented remarka-
bly similar fact patterns.223 Nevertheless, Butros overruled Gon-
zales insofar as the latter terminated LPR status at the time of 
an administratively final deportation order.224 The second com-
ponent of Gonzales, that LPR status is required at the time 
§ 212(c) relief is sought, was passively affirmed.2211 
1. The Ninth Circuit Justifiably Overruled Gonzales But 
Passively Affirmed the LPR-Status Requirement 
The Ninth Circuit, in Butros v. INS,226 asserted that "the 
domicile. The Ninth Circuit's recognition of a final deportation order would necessarily 
hinge on whether or not the alien possessed a seven-year lawful domicile. This result is 
also undesirable because the finality of a deportation order is logically unrelated to the 
length of an alien's lawful domicile. 
220. Butros, 990 F.2d at 1146. If the Butros rule allowed aliens under administra-
tively final deportation orders to accord relatives visa preferences, then such aliens could 
petition relatives into the United States while they, themselves, are in the process of 
exiting the country. This result is obviously undesirable. See, e,g., Matter of Lok II, 18 I. 
& N. Dec. at 106 (1981) (labeling such a scenario an "incongruous result."». 
If the Butros rule did not allow aliens under administratively final deportation or-
ders to accord relatives visa preferences, then the alien would not really have complete 
LPR status. The Ninth Circuit would have to recognize a quasi-LPR status which allows 
the alien some, but not all, benefits of lawful residence in the United States. This result 
is also undesirable because is opens the door to limiting the LPR status of legal 
immigrants. 
221. 990 F.2d 1142 (9th Cir. 1993). 
222. 921 F.2d 236 (9th Cir. 1990). 
223. Both Butros and Gonzales lawfully resided in the United States for well over 
seven years before being charged with deportation. See Butros, 990 F.2d at 1142-43; 
Gonzales, 921 F.2d at 237. Both conceded deportability but sought § 212(c) relief. Bu-
tros, 990 F.2d at 1143; Gonzales, 921 F.2d at 237. In both cases, § 212(c) relief was de-
nied and the deportation order was affirmed by the BIA. Butros, 990 F.2d at 1143; Gon-
zales, 921 F.2d at 237. Both Butros and Gonzales then made a motion pursuant to 8 
C.F.R. § 3.2 asking the BIA to reevaluate the denial of § 212(c) relief. Butros, 990 F.2d 
at 1143; Gonzales, 921 F.2d at 237. The BIA denied the motions because the alien lost 
LPR status upon the administrative finality of the deportation order. Butros, 990 F.2d at 
1143; Gonzales, 921 F.2d at 238. 
224. Butros, 990 F.2d at 1145. 
225. See Butros, 990 F.2d 1142. 
226. 990 F.2d 1142 (9th Cir. 1993). 
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fallacy of Gonzales is the belief that what is final for certain ad-
ministrative purposes is final for all purposes. "227 The Butros 
court then reasoned that an administratively final deportation 
order may not be truly final because the BIA could reopen or 
reconsider,228 and had done so in the past.229 Accordingly, recog-
nition of finality was extended to the point at which the BIA 
could no longer reopen or reconsider the case.230 
The Butros court overruled Gonzales and redefined final-
ity.231 Conversely, the court passively affirmed the Gonzales re-
quirement that an alien must possess present LPR status to be 
eligible for § 212(c) relief.232 The Gonzales requirement was 
based on a misinterpretation of Matter of Lok II.233 It is unsup-
ported by statutory language or legislative history.23' The re-
quirement even defies common sense: If the purpose of § 212(c) 
is to offer relief from deportation and if deportation terminates 
LPR status, would it not defeat § 212(c)'s purpose to require 
LPR status to seek relief from deportation? If the Ninth Circuit 
were to answer "No," then isn't § 212(c) relief from deportation 
available to only those aliens who have not been found 
deportable? 
As justification for overruling Gonzales, the Butros court 
seized upon Gonzales' illogical concern that aliens who had de-
parted the country would qualify for § 212(c) relief. 23Ii The Bu-
tros court correctly pointed out that the BIA's regulations ex-
pressly prevented physically-departed aliens from moving to 
reopen or reconsider.236 The Gonzales court apparently ignored 
227. Id. at 1145 (criticizing Gonzales v. INS, 921 F.2d 236 (9th Cir. 1990)). 
228. The BrA is only prohibited from reopening or reconsidering cases of aliens who 
have physically departed the country. See 8 C.F.R. § 3.2; see supra note 26 for the text 
of the regulation. 
229. Butros, 990 F.2d at 1145. 
230. See id. 
231. Id. at 1145. 
232. See id. at 1144-46. 
233. 181. & N. Dec. 101; see supra notes 197-220 and accompanying text describing 
how the misinterpretation arose. 
234. See supra note 2 for the language of the statute. Recall, the legislative discus-
sions regarding § 212(c) did not anticipate its application to deportation proceedings. 
235. Butros, 990 F.2d at 1145-46. 
236. Id.; see 8 C.F.R. § 3.2 ("A motion to reopen or a motion to reconsider shall not 
be made by or in behalf of a person who is the subject of deportation proceedings subse-
quent to his departure from the United States."). 
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judicial affirmance of the administratively final deportation or-
der as a stage, prior to the physical-departure stage, when an 
alien could be deemed to have lost LPR status.237 Had the Ninth 
Circuit been solely interested in correcting this oversight, the 
appropriate solution, in Butros, could have been to rule that an 
alien loses LPR status only after review by the Ninth Circuit.238 
By ruling that for purposes of § 212(c) relief, an alien maintains 
eligibility until physical deportation and not until the deporta-
tion order is judicially affirmed, the Ninth Circuit displayed its 
willingness to correct Gonzales but failed to address the under-
lying problem at Gonzales' core. 
2. In Overruling Gonzales, the Ninth Circuit Has Created 
Different Deference Standards With Respect to the Com-
mencement and Termination of Lawful Domicile 
In overruling Gonzales v. INS,239 the Ninth Circuit declined 
to defer to the BIA's judgment as to when lawful domicile termi-
nates.240 This decision cannot be reconciled with the Ninth Cir-
cuit's decision to defer to the BIA on the issue of when lawful 
domicile commences.241 Such selective deference is no deference 
at all. The Ninth Circuit seemingly professes to defer to the 
BIA's reasoned judgment, but only if it agrees with that 
judgment. 
237. See Gonzales, 921 F.2d at 238-41. Judicial affirmance of an administratively 
final deportation order is precisely the third stage the BIA considered. See supra note 79 
and accompanying text listing the stages upon which the deportation order could be 
deemed final. 
238. This solution more appropriately addresses Gonzales' concern regarding indefi-
nite § 212(c) eligibility. Viewed in terms of the four stages suggested by the BIA, in 
Matter of Lok II, the Gonzales court feared the fourth stage. See Matter of Lok II 18 I. 
& N. Dec. 101, 105 (1981) (describing the second stage as administrative finality, the 
third stage as judicial finality, and the fourth stage as physical departure); see also supra 
notes 76-80 and accompanying text discussing the BIA's four-stage analysis. The Gonza-
les court strongly disapproved of the fourth stage and responded by adopting the second 
stage. Inexplicably, they skipped over the third stage without apparently recognizing its 
existence. If this oversight was all the Butros court sought to correct, they could have 
limited their holding to terminate LPR status at the third, and not the fourth, stage. 
239. 921 F.2d 236 (9th Cir. 1990). 
240. See Butros v. INS, 990 F.2d 1142, 1144-46 (9th Cir. 1992). Recall, the domicile 
accrued by an alien while an LPR qualifies as a lawful domicile. Therefore, once stripped 
of LPR status, the alien's lawful domicile simultaneously ends. 
241. Castillo-Felix v. INS, 601 F.2d 459, 465 (9th Cir. 1979). See also supra note 74 
discussing the commencement of lawful domicile. 
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The Butros decision is better understood by analyzing the 
context in which it was decided. First, the majority may have 
been swayed by the facts and was thus compelled to grant relief. 
Recall, Butros had a relatively low degree of criminal involve-
ment242 and deportation would have inflicted a severe hardship 
upon him.243 Second, such relief could not be granted unless 
Gonzales was distinguished or overruled. Since the material 
facts in Gonzales paralleled those in Butros, distinguishing the 
cases, convincingly, would likely have been difficult. Finally, the 
majority did not observe the fine distinction within Matter of 
Lok II-that LPR status is only required to calculate the seven-
year lawful domicile requirement and not to file a motion to reo-
pen or reconsider the denial of § 212(c) relief. The net result is a 
rule which partially compensates for Gonzales' shortcomings, 
but unwisely preserves an alien's LPR status beyond the point 
of an administratively final deportation order. 
C. POTENTIAL PROBLEMS CAUSED By THE BUTROS RULE 
The Ninth Circuit, in Butros v. INS,244 emphasized that it 
was not deciding "when an alien ceases to accumulate credit to-
ward seven years of lawful permanent residence."245 However, to 
prevent those aliens with a sub-seven-year lawful domicile from 
benefitting under the Butros rule, the Ninth Circuit, in future 
cases, would have to either (1) terminate an alien's LPR status 
only if the alien did not possess a seven-year lawful domicile 
when the deportation order became administratively final or 
(2) rule that at the time of an administratively final deportation 
order, an alien loses LPR status unless the alien is seeking to 
reopen or reconsider deportation proceedings to seek § 212(c) 
relief· 
242. Cf, Gonzales, 921 F.2d at 237. Gonzales had been convicted of four unrelated 
crimes: (1) in 1976, for receiving stolen property; (2) in 1983, for disturbing the peace; (3) 
in 1984, for aiding and abetting an armed robbery; and (4) in 1985, for being under the 
influence of heroin and for possession of a hypodermic needle. 
By contrast Butros' record reflected only one conviction at the time of his § 212(c) 
hearing. See supra notes 16-19 and accompanying text discussing Butros' criminal 
involvement. 
243. See supra notes 18 and 21 relating facts which suggest that deportation would 
severely penalize Butros. 
244. 990 F.2d 1142 (9th Cir. 1993). 
245. Butros, 990 F.2d at 1146. 
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Both alternatives are flawed. Under the first option, aliens 
possessing seven-years of lawful domicile would not lose their 
LPR status until physically deported.246 Thus, such aliens await-
ing the flight back home would be entitled to all the rights and 
privileges reserved for LPRs. Such deportable aliens could then 
sponsor relatives to enter the United States as LPRs.247 In the 
event deportation could not be completed,248 the legal status of 
such aliens would be unaffected by the deportation process. 
Such results are quite obviously unacceptable. 
Under the second option, aliens moving to reopen or recon-
sider deportation proceedings to seek § 212(c) relief would re-
tain LPR status, whereas non-moving aliens would not. Such a 
rule is wholly undesirable because the determination as to an 
alien's lawful permanent resident status would lie within the 
alien's, and not the government's, control. Such a scenario could 
arguably motivate the filing' of spurious motions to reopen or re-
consider an adverse ruling by the BIA to preserve LPR status. It 
could also foreseeably lead to inconsistent LPR-status classifica-
tions. For example, an alien would be considered an LPR to 
move to reopen or reconsider the denial of § 212(c) relief, but 
the same alien would not be considered an LPR for the related 
purpose of accumulating time toward the seven-year 
requirement.249 
D. THE NINTH CIRCUIT'S ADDITION TO THE CIRCUIT SPLITTING 
PROBLEM 
The Ninth Circuit's ruling has also added more complexity 
to an area of the law already replete with inconsistencies.250 
With respect to when lawful domicile commences, at present, 
246. See 8 C.F.R. § 3.2; see supra note 26 for the text of the regulation. 
247. See Matter of Lok II, 18 I. & N. Dec. 101, 106 (1981) (disapproving of a rule 
which allowed deportable aliens to accord relatives visa preference so long as the aliens 
remain in this country). 
248. See, e.g., 8 U.S.C. § 1253(g) (imposing sanctions on countries which deny or 
delay acceptance of deportees); 8 U.S.C. § 1253(h) (Supp. IV 1992) (restricting physical 
deportation when the alien's life or freedom would be threatened in the destined 
country). 
249. See Butros, 990 F.2d at 1147 (Trott, J., dissenting). 
250. Butros v. INS, 990 F.2d 1142 (9th Cir. 1993). See supra notes 73-108 and ac-
companying text for a detailed discussion of the various § 212(c) interpretations em-
ployed by circuit courts. 
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the Fourth and Ninth Circuits follow the BIA's approach requir-
ing the alien to establish a lawful domicile after being lawfully 
admitted for permanent residence.2111 The Second and D.C. Cir-
cuits, however, may allow the alien to accrue the time he law-
fully resided in the United States, prior to admission as an LPR, 
as part of his lawful dom~cile. m 
With respect to when lawful domicile terminates, the Fifth 
and Seventh Circuits abide by the BIA's reasoning in terminat-
ing lawful domicile upon an administratively final deportation 
order.m The Second and Ninth Circuits agree with the BIA so 
long as the alien has conceded deportability.2114 The Eleventh 
Circuit, through its simple and effective, though extremely 
harsh, solution, terminates lawful domicile when the order to 
show cause is issued. 21111 
With respect to motions to reopen or reconsider the denial 
of § 212(c) relief, the Ninth Circuit, prior to Butros, required 
that the alien possess present. LPR status to maintain statutory 
eligibility.2116 The Second Circuit apparently allows such motions 
if the alien was statutorily eligible when deportation proceedings 
began.2117 
Despite the existing multiplicity of § 212(c) constructions, 
the Ninth Circuit has now unveiled its own peculiar interpreta-
tion,2118 one that is as distinct from the prevailing views as they 
are from each other.2119 With so many different applications of 
251. See Chiravacharadhikul v. INS, 645 F.2d 248, 250 (4th Cir. 1981); Castillo-Felix 
v. INS, 601 F.2d 459 (9th Cir. 1979); Matter of Lok l, 15 I. & N. Dec. 720 (1976). 
252. See Tim Lok I, 548 F.2d 37, 40 (2d Cir. 1977); Anwo v. INS, 607 F.2d 435, 437 
(D.C. Cir. 1979). . 
253. See Rivera v. INS, 810 F.2d 540, 542 (5th Cir. 1987); Variamparambil v. INS, 
831 F.2d 1362, 1366 (7th Cir. 1987); Matter of Lok II, 18 I. & N. Dec. 101, 105 (1981); see 
also supra notes 76-80 and accompanying text discussing the BIA's reasoning. 
254. See Tim Lok II, 681 F.2d 107, 110 (2d Cir. 1982); Wall v. INS, 722 F.2d 1442, 
1444 (9th Cir. 1984). 
255. See Marti-Xiques v. INS, 741 F.2d 355 (11th Cir. 1984); see also supra notes 
83-85 and accompanying text discussing the Eleventh Circuit's approach. 
256. See Gonzales v. INS, 921 F.2d 236, 238 (9th Cir. 1993); see also supra notes 96-
101 and accompanying text discussing the Gonzales rationale. 
257. See Vargas v. INS, 938 F.2d 358, 361 (2d Cir. 1991); see also supra notes 102-
04 and accompanying text discussing the Second Circuit's view. 
258. See Butros, 990 F.2d at 1145. 
259. ld. at 1151-53 (Trott, J., dissenting); see also supra notes 176-85 and accompa-
nying text summarizing Judge Trott's discussion of the various views. 
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the same federal statute, Judge Trott was certainly prudent to 
admonish "[w]hat happens to an alien in this context depends 
entirely on where it happens."26o 
E. THE BETTER VIEW 
The better solution would be to terminate LPR status at 
the time of administrative finality but to abolish the present-
LPR-status requirement as a prerequisite to seeking § 212(c) re-
lief. Thus, non-LPR aliens would be eligible for § 212(c) relief 
so long as they maintained a seven-year lawful domicile prior to 
the deportation order. Likewise, a motion to reopen or recon-
sider the denial of § 212(c) relief should not be barred solely 
because the alien does not possess LPR status when making the 
motion. Under this approach, Butros would still be allowed to 
move to reopen or reconsider the denial of § 212(c) relief be-
cause he possessed the requisite seven-year lawful domicile 
before being found deportable.261 
1. The Proposed Solution is Consistent With Matter of Lok II 
and the Second Circuit's Approach 
Abolishing the requirement that an alien possess present 
LPR status to maintain eligibility for § 212(c) is consistent with 
Matter of Lok II.262 There, the BIA ruled that an administra-
tively final deportation order terminates LPR status. 263 The BIA 
then held Lok to be statutorily ineligible for § 212(c) relief.264 
The Ninth Circuit has since inferred that termination of LPR 
status automatically renders an alien statutorily ineligible for 
§ 212(c) relief.266 
The proposed solution dispels this inference. Rather, it in-
terprets the termination of LPR status as affecting only the cal-
culation of the alien's lawful domicile. Once LPR status is termi-
nated, courts and the BIA must still ask whether the alien 
260. Butros, 990 F.2d 1142, 1152 (Trott, J., dissenting). 
261. See Butros v. INS, 990 F.2d 1142, 1143 (9th Cir. 1993). 
262. 18 I. & N. Dec. 101 (1981). 
263. Id. at 105. 
264. Id. at 110. 
265. See Gonzales u. INS, 921 F.2d 236, 238 (9th Cir. 1990). 
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possessed seven years of lawful domicile. If the alien did not, a 
motion to reopen or reconsider would have to be denied not be-
cause the alien had lost status as one "lawfully admitted for per-
manent residence" but because the alien did not possess seven 
years of lawful domicile. Simply stated, present LPR status 
should not be required to move to reopen or reconsider the de-
nial of § 212(c) relief from deportation. 
Such an interpretation is perfectly consistent with the Mat-
ter of Lok II holding, as Lok would be barred from reopening or 
reconsidering because he possessed less than five years of lawful 
domicile at the time his deportation order became administra-
tively fina1. 266 If an alien possessed seven years of lawful domi-
cile at some point prior to administrative finality, however, then 
a later motion to reopen or reconsider should be entertained.267 
This interpretation is also consistent with the Second Cir-
cuit's handling of motions to reopen the denial of § 212(c) re-
lief.268 In Vargas v. INS, the alien's factual setting mirrored that 
of Butros.269 Vargas arrived in the U.S. as an LPR when he was 
four years old.270 Sixteen years later, he was convicted of crimi-
nal posse'ssion of cocaine.271 At the following deportation pro-
ceeding, Vargas conceded deportability but sought § 212(c) re-
lief.272 The immigration judge denied relief and the BIA later 
dismissed the appeal. 273 Vargas moved to reopen to present new 
evidence, most notably the birth of a child and a following mar-
riage.274 The BIA denied the motion to reopen under the belief 
that Matter of Lok II was controlling. The BIA reasoned that 
Vargas lost LPR status at' the time his initial appeal was dis-
missed, that LPR status was necessary for § 212(c) eligibility, 
and that Vargas was thus statutorily ineligible for § 212(c) 
relief.27C1 
266. See Matter of Lok II, 18 I. & N. Dec. at 104. 
267. The alien will still have to meet a heavy burden in proving that reopening or 
reconsideration is warranted. See Matter of Coelho, Int. Dec. 3172 (BIA Apr 30, 1992). 
268. See Vargas v. INS, 938 F.2d 358 (2d Cir. 1991). 
269. See supra notes 16-31 and accompanying text for Butros' facts. 
270. Vargas, 938 F.2d at 359. 
271. Id. 
272. Id. 
273. Id. at 359-60. 
274. Id. at 360. 
275. See id. (citing Matter of Lok II, 18 I. & N. Dec. 101). 
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The Second Circuit, on appeal, distinguished Matter of Lok 
II.276 The Vargas court recognized that in Matter of Lok II, "the 
BIA denied the application of a permanent resident alien for 
Section 212(c) relief because the alien had failed to accrue the 
required seven years of 'lawful unrelinquished domicile' and 
was therefore statutorily ineligible."277 The Vargas court noted 
that "for purposes of calculating the seven-year requirement, 
Lok's status as a permanent resident ended when he failed to 
appeal the Immigration Judge's finding of deportability."278 The 
Second Circuit read Matter of Lok II to stand "only for the pro-
position that an alien cannot become eligible for discretionary 
relief through subsequent accrual of time towards the seven-year 
threshold, once he has conceded that he is deportable."279 The 
Second Circuit believed that if the alien was eligible for relief 
before conceding deportability, then a later finding of de-
portability would not divest such eligibility.280 
2. The Proposed Solution Should Be Followed Until Congress 
or the United States Supreme Court Acts With Respect to 
Section-212(c)-Type Relief From Deportation 
The panoply of § 212(c) interpretations quite obviously 
stems from good-faith judicial and administrative efforts to ap-
ply § 212(c) to proceedings the statute was never designed to 
affect.281 As additional circuit courts address the issue, the po-
tential for even further misapplication increases. Although the 
BIA and the circuit courts employ good-faith efforts to abide by 
the statutory purpose of § 212(c), the result has been a con-
glomeration of opposing and tangential views. Since the Ninth 
Circuit's decision in Butros v. INS,282 the Third and Fourth Cir-
276. Vargas, 938 F.2d at 360 ("Matter of Lok (Ill, however, is not an adequate basis 
for the BIA's position."); id. at 361 ("[tlhe concern which motivated the creation of the 
rule in Matter of Lok (Ill-preventing an alien from manipulating deportability pro-
ceedings so as to acquire the seven years of domicile-is not present here."). 
277. [d. at 360-61 (emphasis added). 
278. [d. (emphasis added). 
279. [d. 
280. See id. 
281. See Butros v. INS, 990 F.2d 1142 (9th Cir. 1993); Vargas v. INS, 938 F.2d 358 
(2d Cir. 1991); Gonzales v. INS, 921 F.2d 236 (9th Cir. 1990); Marti-Xiques v. INS, 741 
F.2d 350 (11th Cir. 1984); Francis v. INS, 532 F.2d 268 (2d Cir. 1976); Matter of Lok II, 
18 I. & N. Dec. 101 (1981); Matter of G.A., 7 I. & N. Dec. 274 (1956); Matter of S., 6 I. & 
N. 392 (1954); Matter of L., 1 I. & N. Dec. 1 (1940) .. 
282. 990 F.2d 1142 (9th Cir. 1993). 
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cuits have criticized the Ninth Circuit's position in favor of the 
BIA's position.283 The First and Seventh Circuits, however, have 
chosen rules similar in effect to the Butros rule.284 
The answer, apparently, lies not in judicial or administra-
tive statutory construction but in new legislation which will as-
semble the sensible rules into a statute directly addressing de-
portation proceedings. Such a statute will prevent the courts 
from delving into the statutory purpose of § 212(c)-a process 
which, considering that the legislative discussion regarding 
§ 212(c) did not anticipate its application to deportable aliens, 
is really little more than a farce. Barring the ehactment of legis-
lation, only the United States Supreme Court can universally 
clarify the rules.281i Until then, the circuit courts, as well as the 
BIA, would be wise to allow deportable aliens to move to reopen 
their cases so long as they had maintained a lawful domicile for 
the requisite seven years at some point prior to an administra-
tively final deportation order. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
In Butros v. INS,286 the Ninth Circuit ruled that a deporta-
tion order is not final if the decision can be appealed or if the 
BIA can reopen or reconsider the case.287 Nairn Butros was thus 
able to continue seeking § 212(c) relief. In its ruling the Ninth 
Circuit focused on the deportation order's finality and extended 
the point at which LPR status terminates. The Ninth Circuit 
could have achieved the same fair result by simply abolishing 
the present LPR status requirement for aliens seeking § 212(c) 
relief from deportation. Such a ruling would have streamlined 
the immigration laws. rather than unduly complicating matters. 
283. See Katsis v. INS, 997 F.2d 1067, 1075-76 (3d Cir. 1993); Nwolise v. INS, 4 
F.3d 306 (4th Cir. 1993). 
284. See Goncalves v. INS, 6 F.3d 830 (1st Cir. 1993); Henry v. INS, 8 F.3d 426 (7th 
Cir. 1993). 
285. Although the circuits are splitting, the U.S. Supreme Court has been reluctant 
to take cases in this area of the law. See, e.g., Nwolise, 4 F.3d 306, cert. denied, 127 L. 
Ed. 2d 82 (1994); Katsis, 997 F.2d 1067, cert. denied, 127 L. Ed. 2d 93 (1994); Ghassan v. 
INS, 972 F.2d 631 (5th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 1412 (1993); 
Chiravacharadhikul v. INS, 645 F.2d 248 (4th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 893 
(1981). 
286. 990 F.2d 1142 (9th Cir. 1993). 
287. Butros, 990 F.2d at 1145. 
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Until Congress enacts legislation directly providing § 212(c) 
type relief from deportation, or until the United States Supreme 
Court rules on the issue, this proposal is the most sensible con-
struction of § 212(c). 
Mark Figueiredo* 
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